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ABSTRACT
Debates about statutory interpretation—and especially about the
role of the canons of construction and legislative history—are
generally framed in one-size-fits-all terms. Yet federal judges—
including most Supreme Court Justices—have not approached
statutory interpretation from a methodologically uniform perspective.
This Article presents the first in-depth examination of interpretive
approaches taken in two distinct subject areas over an extended
period of time. Professors Brudney and Ditslear compare how the
Supreme Court has relied on legislative history and the canons of
construction when construing tax statutes and workplace statutes from
1969 to 2008.
The authors conclude that the Justices tend to rely on legislative
history for importantly different reasons in these two fields. The Court
regularly invokes committee reports and floor statements in the
workplace law area for the traditional role of identifying and
elaborating on the legislative bargain that Congress reached. By
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contrast, the Justices often rely on the legislative history
accompanying tax statutes to borrow expertise from key committee
actors. The Court’s use of tax legislative history for expertiseborrowing purposes relates to the distinctive nature of how tax
legislative history is produced, featuring regular cross-party and
interbranch cooperation that is virtually unimaginable in the
workplace law setting. Although most Justices have appreciated the
special character of tax legislative history, Justice Scalia remains
steadfast in his unwillingness to do so.
With respect to the use of canons, Brudney and Ditslear find that
the Court makes comparatively heavier use of the whole act rule and
related structural canons in its tax majorities. The authors suggest that
the Justices may recognize the Internal Revenue Code to be more of a
coherent and self-contained regulatory scheme than the series of
workplace law statutes scattered across multiple titles of the U.S.
Code. As for substantive canons, the Justices are much more likely to
invoke tax-based judicial policy norms than to rely on canons
grounded in the specifics of workplace law. The authors contend that
the Court’s use of these tax law canons should be viewed as a
derivative form of expertise borrowing.
Finally, Brudney and Ditslear explore the special role played by
Justice Blackmun in the tax area. They demonstrate how Blackmun’s
expertise in tax law and his attentiveness to its legislative history
anchored the Court’s performance for twenty-four years. Since
Blackmun’s retirement, the other Justices have been less interested in
reviewing tax cases and far less willing to use legislative history when
they choose to decide such cases.
The evidence that familiar interpretive resources play distinctive
roles in the area of tax law contributes to a subtler and richer texture
for statutory interpretation than is often captured in scholarly debates.
At the same time, the authors’ results also indicate that the Court since
the late 1980s has exhibited greater uniformity in its reasoning in tax
law and workplace law cases. Brudney and Ditslear wonder whether
the philosophical arguments favoring a more inflexible approach to
statutory interpretation are beginning to trump a pragmatic
orientation that is more sensitive to differences among particular
subject matter areas of federal law.
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INTRODUCTION
Among judges and legal scholars, debates about statutory
interpretation—and especially about the role of the canons of
construction and legislative history—are generally framed in one-sizefits-all terms. The canons receive praise as interpretive rules that limit
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judicial discretion and render statutory meaning more predictable;
they draw criticism for being readily manipulable and for frustrating
2
the policy preferences of Congress. Similarly, legislative history has
both advocates and detractors: critics contend that judges should
ignore such record materials because they are incoherent, unreliable,
3
and politicized, whereas supporters identify the probative and
democratic virtues of legislative materials in comparably systemic
4
language.
These debates can be productive and illuminating, but they tend
to obscure the fact that federal judges—including most Supreme
Court Justices—do not approach statutory interpretation from
5
methodologically uniform perspectives. One important factor that
Justices may recognize and incorporate, even if implicitly, is the
6
diverse subject matter of the laws that come before them. Congress
follows the same basic lawmaking process when enacting and
updating regulatory schemes—whether they address criminal law,
antitrust, labor relations, civil rights, or tax law. Yet salient

1. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25–29 (1997); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 147–
57 (1990); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 943–45 (1992).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 276–83
(1985); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562, 572 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, Modern
Statutes, Loose Canons and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45
VAND. L. REV. 579, 590 (1992).
3. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 1, at 31–37; ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 89–115 (2006); Alex
Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 807, 812–14 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 447 (1990).
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 304, 310–17 (2d ed. 2006); KENT
GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 173–75 (1999);
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845, 847 (1992); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 437–42 (2005); Charles Tiefer,
The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205,
230–32.
5. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) (arguing that judges
use a pragmatic approach to decide cases); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (providing a strategic account of Supreme Court jurisprudence).
6. Other factors influencing judicial reasoning approaches include individual biography
and institutional dynamics. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 50–
154 (2006); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 56–181; POSNER, supra note 5, at 125–73.
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differences in semantic formulation and political dynamics help shape
these enactments, and such differences can influence judicial efforts
to understand what Congress has wrought. Relatedly, federal statutes
reflect policy preferences that are straightforwardly ideological in
certain subject areas, whereas in others the policy choices are
couched in technically intricate and even obscure terms.
In this Article, we examine how the Supreme Court’s uses of
legislative history and the canons of construction vary based on the
subject matter of laws enacted by Congress. We do so by comparing
the Court’s interpretive approach to a highly specialized and
relatively collaborative area of lawmaking—the Internal Revenue
Code—with the Court’s methods of interpretation in the field of
workplace law, which is among the most ideologically divisive and
partisan areas of congressional activity. Our comparative assessment
relies on two Supreme Court datasets we have compiled over a period
of years: nearly 160 decisions construing the Internal Revenue Code
from 1969–2008, and roughly 600 cases applying federal workplace
7
statutes over the same thirty-nine year period. Our general
hypothesis is that the Court’s patterns of reasoning in the oftenarcane tax law field will differ in meaningful respects from its use of
key interpretive resources when construing civil rights and labor
relations texts that are generated through a more traditionally
politicized legislative process.
Our findings support this hypothesis, often in striking ways.
8
Initially, we determine that the Court is significantly more likely to
rely on legislative history to help justify tax law decisions than it is to
help explain workplace law outcomes. This difference arises in the
Burger Court years (1969–86) and the Rehnquist and Roberts Court
9
period (1986–2008); it has persisted until quite recently even as the
Court’s legislative history reliance declines over time in both subject
matter areas. In addition, we find that the Court relies significantly
more often on language canons in tax law than in workplace law,

7. For a discussion of how we assembled these datasets, see infra Part I.B.
8. For an explanation of statistical significance in this context, see infra note 82.
9. The Roberts Court has only three terms of decisions through June 2008 (including five
cases construing the tax code and twenty-five cases applying workplace law statutes). This Court
also includes seven of the nine Rehnquist Court Justices, including Justices Scalia, Breyer, and
Stevens, whose views on statutory interpretation methods have been expressed and applied over
an extended period. Accordingly, we have grouped the first three years of the Roberts Court
with the Rehnquist Court for purposes of empirical analysis.
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whereas the Court’s use of substantive canons is comparable between
10
the two statutory areas.
Probing further, we conclude that the Justices tend to rely on
legislative history for importantly different reasons in these two fields.
The Court regularly invokes committee reports and floor statements
in the workplace law area for the traditional role of identifying and
elaborating on the legislative bargain that Congress reached. By
contrast, the Justices often rely on the legislative history
accompanying tax statutes to borrow expertise from key committee
actors. We identify this difference in function by assessing the
variation in types of legislative history relied on in each subject
matter area, comparing the Justices’ propensity to disagree about the
meaning of legislative history in their nonunanimous decisions, and
discussing illustrative majority opinions from the tax field.
The Court’s use of tax legislative history for expertise-borrowing
purposes is due in no small measure to the complex, specialized, and
often opaque substantive concepts in dispute. But this expertise
borrowing also relates to the unusual nature of how tax legislative
history is produced, featuring regular cross-party and interbranch
cooperation that is virtually unimaginable in the workplace law
setting. Most Justices seem to appreciate the distinctive character of
tax legislative history, in which the Joint Committee on Taxation
(JCT) plays a central role. Justice Scalia, however, is unwilling to do
so, as exemplified by one of his earliest opinions, which was critical of
11
legislative history produced in the tax setting.
We also find some intriguing differences between the Court’s use
of the canons in tax cases and workplace decisions. With respect to
language canons, the Court makes comparatively heavier use of the
whole act rule and related structural canons in its tax majorities. We
suggest that the Justices may recognize the Internal Revenue Code to
be more of a coherent and self-contained regulatory scheme than the
series of workplace law statutes scattered across multiple titles of the
U.S. Code. As for substantive canons, the Justices are much more
likely to invoke tax-based judicial policy norms than to rely on canons
grounded in the specifics of workplace law. We contend that the

10. For an explanation of the difference between language canons and substantive canons,
see infra Part I.A.1.
11. See Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 1985); infra Part III.A.4 (discussing
Hirshey).
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Court’s use of these tax law canons may be sensibly viewed as a
subsidiary form of expertise borrowing.
In addition, we note one other difference in the Court’s
comparative approach to tax law decisions—the disproportionate role
played by Justice Blackmun. During his twenty-four terms on the
Court, Blackmun, a former tax law practitioner, authored 30 percent
of the Court’s majorities construing the Internal Revenue Code.
Because this is almost double the frequency of authorship for any
other Justice in the field of workplace law, we examine Justice
Blackmun’s interpretive approach in the tax law area. We find that
his use of legislative history is high—close to 60 percent of his tax
majorities—although legislative history reliance by Blackmun’s
colleagues during his tenure on the Court is even higher at 67 percent,
including 64 percent during the first eight terms of the Rehnquist
12
period.
After Justice Blackmun’s retirement in 1994, however, the
Court’s legislative history reliance in tax decisions declined
significantly to 34 percent. In addition, the Court’s appetite for
deciding tax cases has diminished noticeably since 1994. Without the
anchoring presence of Blackmun’s expertise in tax law, the Justices
seem both less interested in reviewing tax cases and less comfortable
making use of legislative history when they choose to decide such
cases. Justice Blackmun’s reluctance to invoke tax-specific
substantive canons also distinguishes him from his colleagues; this
reluctance may well reflect Blackmun’s confidence in his ability to
reason through particular disputes over the meaning of tax law.
Our Article represents the first in-depth effort to compare the
Court’s interpretive approach in two distinct subject areas over an
13
extended period of time. We view this comparative treatment as
important because it demonstrates how the Justices apply key
interpretive resources such as legislative history and the canons in
ways that are more complex and nuanced than previously understood.

12. For our findings on Blackmun majorities and the Court’s use of legislative history in tax
cases before and after Blackmun’s retirement, see infra Part II.D.
13. We are aware of one prior study that addressed legislative history use in an earlier era.
See Beth M. Henschen, Judicial Use of Legislative History and Intent in Statutory Interpretation,
10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 353, 360–61 (1985) (comparing Supreme Court reasoning in antitrust and
labor law from 1950 to 1972); see also Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1966–69 (2005) (presenting brief comparisons between Justices’
rationales in civil rights and business cases, drawing on the Brudney and Ditslear database and
analyses for the civil rights portion).
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This complexity in turn points to the incomplete nature of recent
debates about the admissibility vel non of legislative history and the
canons’ possible success as impartial or predictive interpretive assets.
By exploring the diverse functions and values ascribed to these
resources in different subject matter settings, we also hope to
encourage further research from scholars engaged in the empirical
14
analysis of judicial reasoning.
Part I introduces the canons and legislative history as
interpretive resources, and summarizes generic disagreements over
their value. Part I also describes our two parallel datasets in
workplace law and tax law. Part II presents our comparative findings,
focused on the Court’s uses of legislative history and the canons as
well as the variations in majority authorship by subject area among
individual Justices. Part III pursues key aspects of our findings from
doctrinal and behavioral standpoints.
I. THE CANONS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND OUR DATASETS
A. Tensions between the Canons and Legislative History
Although it is ultimately the federal courts’ role to resolve
disputes about the meaning of statutory text, each of the three
branches of government contributes important contextual resources
on which courts regularly rely when performing their interpretive
function. Beginning in the 1980s, considerable tension has arisen
between supporters of the canons of construction, a judicially created
interpretive asset, and defenders of legislative history, an interpretive
resource generated by Congress. Because this tension informs much
of the descriptive and normative debate about statutory
15
interpretation, we provide a brief overview here.
14. For a discussion of this emerging research area, see generally Frank B. Cross, The
Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971 (2007);
Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND POLITICS 360, 373–74 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A.
Caldeira eds., 2008); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63 (2008); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the
Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decisionmaking, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873
(2008) (book review).
15. There is also lively debate among scholars and judges about the executive branch’s
distinctive interpretive asset—agency guidance in the form of rules and adjudications. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1097–196 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 852–89 (2001); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
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1. Canons of Construction and Legalistic Interpretation. The
canons of construction are background presumptions that judges have
16
invoked for centuries as interpretive aids. These presumptions are
useful because understanding congressional text inevitably requires
relying on certain principles about “how words should ordinarily be
understood [and about] how regulatory statutes should interact with
17
constitutional structure and substantive policy.” Although canons of
construction can be classified in numerous ways, we follow the
prevailing taxonomy that identifies language canons and substantive
18
canons as the two basic categories.
Language canons relied on by the Supreme Court include
linguistic inferences stemming from Congress’s use of certain words
19
instead of others, grammar and syntax guidelines predicated on the
20
configuration of words in a given sentence, and principles of textual
cohesion arising from the presumed relationship between particular
words and language found in other parts of the same statute or in
21
similar statutes. These language canons are avowedly content
neutral: they purport to give effect to the “ordinary” or “common”
meaning of statutory text based on what a rational Congress must
22
have meant when it chose to enact the words in question.
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827–47, 865–71 (2006); United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–38 (2001); id. at 239–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Smiley v.
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739–46 (1996). We plan to discuss how our datasets
contribute to that debate in a subsequent article.
16. See Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction:
Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies,
86 KY. L.J. 527, 542–43 (1998) (discussing the use of canons in sixteenth century English case
law); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 1179, 1183–91 (describing the use of canons to construe ancient Hindu texts and Biblical
commentary as well as Roman Law).
17. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 150; see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 228 (1975) (suggesting that many canons “reflect the
probabilities generated by normal usage or legislative behavior”).
18. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2005).
19. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. B
at 19–21 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing, inter alia, the canons of noscitur a sociis, expressio unius, and
ordinary usage).
20. See id. app. B at 21 (discussing, inter alia, the punctuation rule, the may-shall rule, and
the rule of the last antecedent).
21. See id. app. B at 21–23 (discussing, inter alia, the whole act rule, the presumption
against redundancy, the presumption of statutory consistency with respect to the same or similar
terms, and the presumption that provisos and exceptions are to be read narrowly).
22. See Ross, supra note 2, at 563; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 927.

BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC

1240

5/5/2009 4:02:09 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1231

By contrast, substantive canons reflect a wide array of judicially
based policy concerns. They are grounded not in semantic verities but
rather in the courts’ understanding of how to harmonize statutory text
23
with judicially identified constitutional priorities, judicially perceived
24
25
statutory objectives, or preenactment common law practices. Most
of the statute-based substantive canons are couched in broadly
26
applicable terms, but some relate to specific subject areas including a
27
number of tax law-related substantive canons.
Ample support is expressed for both sets of canons based on the
common-sense guidance they offer. As rules of thumb addressing how
certain words or phrases often interrelate, or how Congress’s
authority might be reconciled with that of the president, a state
legislature, or an international treaty, the canons “help uncover
28
competing interpretive possibilities.” Moreover, when judges
approach these rules of thumb as presumptive rather than conclusive,
they can question or distinguish the rules in light of other interpretive
29
factors. By effectively encouraging courts to consider additional
sources of legislative meaning, the canons promote a more reflective
judicial conversation that helps provide structure and coherence for
majority opinions. At the same time, there is a risk when canons are
defended not simply as deepening the interpretive inquiry but also—

23. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, app. B at 29–34 (discussing, inter alia, the
presumption against federal preemption of traditional state regulation, the rule of lenity, the
presumption against interpretations that would jeopardize a statute’s constitutionality, and the
presumption favoring concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction over federal claims).
24. See id. app. B at 36–41 (discussing, inter alia, the presumption against repeals by
implication, the strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals, and the presumption that
each side bears its own costs in adjudications).
25. See id. app. B at 34–35 (discussing, inter alia, the rule against extraterritorial application
of U.S. law, the rule against implied waivers of U.S. sovereign immunity, and the presumption
favoring common law usage when Congress employs “words or concepts with well-settled
common law traditions”).
26. See id. app. B at 36–38 (listing examples of canons that apply generally across subject
areas).
27. See id. app. B at 41 (discussing, inter alia, the presumption that IRS tax assessments are
correct, the presumption against a taxpayer claiming income tax deduction, and the
presumption that tax exemptions should be narrowly construed).
28. R.N. Graham, In Defense of Maxims, 22 STATUTE L. REV. 45, 68 (2001).
29. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (using a language canon to
raise a question about congressional intent); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 261–
62 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing for using a substantive canon as a presumption that
triggers consideration of legislative history and other “conventional techniques” of
interpretation).
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less accurately—as enhancing the predictability and impartiality of
enacted law.
The contention that canons are an objective ordering
30
mechanism, a set of “off the rack[] gap-filling” principles, has been
criticized on descriptive and normative grounds, by us as well as
31
The language canons’ asserted predictive value is
others.
undermined by the fact that members of Congress and their staffs
evidently do not consider these canons central to their lawmaking
enterprise. Instead, they view drafting as a highly contextual and
intensely pressured process that involves a shifting coalition of invited
and uninvited players, a process into which generalized rules of
32
construction are not readily incorporated. Further, the language
canons tend to provoke principled disparate applications—this is true
whether they address the structural integrity of the statute as a whole
33
or the semantic consistency of its discrete parts. Substantive canons
often lack predictive value for a related but distinct reason—judges
assign them varying weights in different case-specific circumstances.
These canons may function as virtually irrebuttable clear statement
rules or as mere tiebreakers, but most often they operate as
presumptions that can be overcome by the persuasive force of other
30. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–67 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Shapiro, supra note 1, at 943 (“[T]wo interrelated values that are served are
predictability and fair notice.”).
31. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 276–83; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 103; Ross,
supra note 2, at 562.
32. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 590–604 (2002) (describing the drafting
process as perceived by key staff members); see also James J. Brudney, Congressional
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 16–17, 21–26 (1994) (discussing the fractured and politically sensitive nature of the
congressional lawmaking process).
33. For examples of conflict about the proper application of the whole act rule, see
Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354–55 (1988); id. at 360 (White, J., dissenting);
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 351 (1981); id. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 640 & n.45, 641 (1980); id.
at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For examples of conflict about the proper application of
expressio unius, see Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168–69 (2003); id. at 180–81
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 582–84 (2000); id. at 593–94
(Stevens, J., dissenting). For broader empirical evidence, see Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18,
at 65, 68, 96. We found that majority reliance on language canons is associated with a significant
increase in dissent dependence on language canons as well and that a comparable association
exists between majority and dissent reliance on substantive canons, id. at 68, and we inferred
that in divided decisions the Justices are likely to view the canons as reasonably amenable to
supporting either side, id. at 96.
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34

interpretive resources. Taken together, these uncertainties let judges
exercise considerable discretion when applying both kinds of canons.
As for the canons’ putative impartiality, our prior research on
workplace law decisions indicates that canon reliance by liberal
Justices is associated with liberal outcomes whereas canon usage by
35
conservative Justices is linked to conservative results. Given the
absence of a constraining effect on judicial policy preferences, the
canons may well function as a form of justification for outcomes that
are favored for other reasons, rather than serving as overarching
neutral principles.
Moreover, for the subset of Supreme Court workplace law
decisions in which the majority invokes the canons but ignores
legislative history while the dissent relies on legislative history, the
results have been not content neutral but overwhelmingly
36
conservative. Our doctrinal analysis of these cases indicates that
since the late 1980s, the Court’s conservative majority has used the
canons in such contested cases to frustrate the demonstrable policy
37
preferences of Congress. Tension between canons and legislative
history has thus taken on a distinctly ideological texture at least in the
area of workplace law.
2. Legislative History and Purposive Interpretation. The term
“legislative history” in a federal setting refers primarily to the
materials generated by Congress that manifest a bill’s journey toward
enactment, including any explanations, deliberations, or tradeoffs that
34. The Court’s Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) decisions invoking
the general antipreemption presumption convey the variable probative impact of a given
substantive canon. Over an extended period, the Court has relied on the presumption in
numerous cases to help justify restricting the scope of ERISA, whereas the Court has
distinguished or ignored the presumption in a comparable number of other cases imposing
ERISA preemption. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 106 nn.438–39 (citing six
illustrative decisions). For an example of divergent understandings regarding both the weight
attributable to the presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction and how consistently the
Court has applied this canon in prior years, compare Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248–49,
with id. at 260–66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 57–60.
36. See id. at 68, 77–93.
37. See id. at 93–94, 108–09; see also Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of
Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37, 38–51 (1991) (arguing that the Court’s reliance
on civil rights statutes’ “plain meaning” in the 1970s and 1980s invariably led the Court to
construe the statutes at issue more narrowly than Congress intended); Stephen F. Ross,
Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399, 421–25 (suggesting that
conservative reliance on “plain meaning” in an era of Democratic control of Congress may
result in conservative outcomes that do not honor Congress’s explicit intent).
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38

are part of that enactment process. In Congress’s committee-based
system of drafting, reviewing, and approving bills for consideration by
the full chamber, the legislative history most frequently invoked by
39
courts is standing committee reports. Courts also rely on other
legislative record items, including original bill language, committee
hearings, floor statements and related developments such as proposed
40
amendments and conference reports.
The primary rationale for crediting legislative history as helping
to resolve or amplify textual meaning is that statutes are more than
disembodied textual products—they are a form of communication
41
that reflects a purposive group effort. In seeking to construe this
purposive communication, courts may decide that a specific piece of
legislative history is sufficiently persuasive in context to justify
attributing to Congress as a whole the understanding and intent
42
expressed in the document. The principle of reasonably imputed
institutional approval rests on the assumption that legislative intent
can be derived from Congress’s structure and operation as a
representative body—specifically from the formal and informal
subgroups that Congress effectively charges with responsibility for

38. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 971–72. In addition to this horizontal narrative
accompanying enactment of a particular text, legislative history also may include the vertical
record of how the text under review has evolved or been modified from versions enacted by
prior Congresses. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 572–74 (1982)
(discussing four earlier versions of a statute penalizing employers for nonpayment of seamen’s
wages); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 614–17 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (discussing multiple earlier versions of a statutory provision listing types of
organizations entitled to tax-exempt status under Internal Revenue Code).
39. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 981 (“Most judges and scholars agree that
committee reports should be considered as authoritative legislative history and should be given
great weight . . . .”).
40. See id. at 971–72, 1000, 1020–22; GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 171.
41. See Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive
Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 967–81 (2007)
(discussing various types of communication, especially within the majority party, that occur at
the early stages of legislative process); James J. Brudney, Intentionalism’s Revival, 44 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1004–08 (2007) (contending that “group intent” is attributable to
Congress); Solan, supra note 4, at 437–49 (presenting a general theory for treating social groups
as entities, and arguing specifically that Congress should be viewed as an entity with intent).
42. See Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276–77 (1996)
(Stevens, J., concurring); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 87–88 (2005); Solan, supra note 4, at 444–49; Tiefer, supra note 4,
at 230–32.

BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC

1244

5/5/2009 4:02:09 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1231

drafting textual provisions and explaining or elaborating on their
43
meaning.
A chorus of legislative history critics have characterized this
interpretive resource as deeply flawed. Some argue that courts should
ignore legislative history for constitutional reasons: it is neither voted
on by Congress nor presented to the president, and the views of
legislative subgroups ought not be elevated over the text approved by
44
Congress as a whole. Critics also contend that legislative history
should be dismissed as conceptually incoherent because the
legislature’s intention or purpose is at best deeply muddled and at
45
worst unknowable.
Legislative history supporters have responded to these
comprehensive critiques in comparably systemic terms. At the
constitutional level, they maintain that rather than viewing legislative
history as “law” or as equivalent to text, courts consult this history to
help attribute meaning to text, just as they do the dictionary, common
law precedent, or the canons, which also are not enacted or approved
46
by Congress. And supporters defend the integrity of a group
47
legislative purpose by applying lessons from political science,
48
49
analytic philosophy, and developmental psychology, as well as
50
more traditional arguments from democratic theory.
An additional all-encompassing criticism of legislative history is
that it lacks neutrality as an interpretive resource. Unlike the canons

43. See Bank One Chi., 516 U.S. at 276–77 (Stevens, J., concurring); George A. Costello,
Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee
Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 60–73;
Brudney, supra note 41, at 1007; Tiefer, supra note 4, at 230–32.
44. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Kozinski, supra note 3, at 813.
45. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 1, at 31–34; Kozinski, supra note 3, at 812–14; John F.
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 99, 102–03
(2006).
46. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 4, at 862–64; Brudney, supra note 32, at 42–45; William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 372–75 (1990).
47. See Tiefer, supra note 4, at 268 (invoking political science research on the institutional
role of committees as producing and supplying superior information to enhance the chamber’s
performance).
48. See Solan, supra note 4, at 437–42 (discussing models of group intent as described by
philosophers Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman); Tiefer, supra note 4, at 255–64
(examining the philosophical approaches of John Austin, H.L.A. Hart, and John Searle).
49. See Solan, supra note 4, at 449–53 (arguing that psychological research shows that it is
common and coherent to understand plural subjects, such as Congress, as having intent).
50. See BREYER, supra note 42, at 15–16, 85–101.

BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC

2009]

5/5/2009 4:02:09 PM

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1245

or judicial precedent, committee and floor statements are produced
by partisans—individuals with a policy stake in the lawmaking contest
to which they are contributing. Disagreement about the implications
of these statements inevitably becomes politically charged, especially
because legislators and their staffs may craft the statements with an
eye toward manipulating or misleading judges as to the meaning of
51
text.
Defenders of legislative history accept the political label but
contend that this is an important dimension of its probative value.
They observe that major legislative proposals are usually altered and
occasionally recast by sponsoring committees or bill managers in an
effort to accommodate concerns of wavering colleagues or to co-opt
segments of the opposition. These substantial postintroduction
changes in text are routinely accompanied by committee or floor
commentaries. Accordingly, courts should appreciate that legislative
bargains are an established feature of congressional lawmaking and
that legislative history may illuminate a bargain’s existence or help
52
explain some of its details.
In sum, the canons are promoted for helping to clarify
inconclusive text in relatively nonpolitical terms; legislative history is
praised for helping to understand the collective political will that
accounts for the text’s successful passage. An implicit premise is that
the virtues of each interpretive resource transcend particular subject
matter areas addressed by Congress—that the canons and legislative
history function in the same ways whether the regulatory scheme at
issue involves criminal law or environmental law, banking law or
military law, employment discrimination or income taxation.
3. Expertise Borrowing as a Distinct Perspective. Public choice
accounts of language canon usage suggest a potential limitation on
this premise of uniform applicability. Professors Macey and Miller
assert that judges rely on language canons more often in statutory

51. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637–38 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61
(1994).
52. See Breyer, supra note 4, at 858–60; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal
Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 146–51 (2008); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 724–27 (1992).

BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC

1246

5/5/2009 4:02:09 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1231
53

cases of technical complexity and minimal ideological interest. They
contend that judges in these instances worry about their lack of
subject matter expertise and the consequent risk of making an
embarrassing policy-related error, and that reliance on language
canons offers a largely nonsubstantive basis for resolving the
54
disputes.
Moreover, tax law scholars and commentators have long
recognized that tax bills and their accompanying legislative history
55
are generated in a unique fashion within Congress. At the
predrafting stage, during the drafting of text, and in the development
of committee reports, the legislative process encourages production
of and reliance on expertise through bipartisan cooperation and
53. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659–65 (1992); cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 247
(suggesting that Justices use canons when they find the cases boring in policy terms).
54. See Macey & Miller, supra note 53, at 662–64, 668–70.
55. See Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 771, 786 & n.73, 818–19 (1997) (arguing that tax law is unique because of the
complexity and ever-changing nature of the tax code and because the process surrounding its
creation is relatively insulated from the influence of special interest groups); Beverly I. Moran &
Daniel M. Schneider, The Elephant and the Four Blind Men: The Burger Court and Its Federal
Tax Decisions, 39 HOW. L.J. 841, 891–95, 903–07 (1996) (outlining reasons why legislative
history is particularly relevant to interpreting tax law and observing that the Burger Court
heavily relied on legislative history in this area). The discussion in this Section and Part III.A.2
relies on observations and analyses from political science as well as law, reflecting perceptions
of the tax legislation process from the 1950s to 2008. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, About the
Joint Committee on Taxation 5–8, 16, http://www.house.gov/jct/About_Joint_Committee_
On_Taxation.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2009); Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the
Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 832–42
(1991) (stating that Professor Livingston served as legislative attorney for the Joint Committee
on Taxation from 1983–87); Bradford L. Ferguson, Frederic W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick,
Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of
the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 809–12 (1989) (noting that the three authors, in private practice as of
1989, had direct and extensive experience in the tax legislative process between 1961 and 1980—
Lubick as Tax Legislation Counsel of the Treasury Department (1961–64) and Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy (1977–81); Hickman as Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy (1972–75); and Ferguson as Tax Legislative Assistant to a Senate
Finance Committee member (1975–77), Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy (1977–79), and Associate Tax Legislation Counsel of the Treasury
Department (1979–80)); John F. Manley, Congressional Staff and Public Policy-Making: The
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 30 J. POL. 1046, 1048–65 (1968) (highlighting
that Manley, a political scientist, interviewed twenty-three members of the House Ways and
Means Committee, eight members of the Senate Finance Committee, five members of the
congressional staff, and three high-ranking Treasury Department officials); Lawrence N.
Woodworth, Procedures Followed by Congress in Enacting Tax Legislation and the Role of the
Joint Committee Staff in that Process, 18 INST. ON FED. TAX’N 21, 23–32 (1966). Woodworth was
an economist on the JCT from 1944–64 and Chief of Staff for the JCT from 1964–77.
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interbranch dialogue. The lynchpin for this distinctively objective and
collaborative effort is the Joint Committee on Taxation. The JCT
includes five members from the Senate Finance Committee and five
56
from the House Ways and Means Committee. Supported by a
nonpartisan staff of economists, lawyers, and other tax professionals,
the JCT oversees the preparation of standing committee reports. As
57
Part III of this Article explains, tax committee report commentaries
help legislators make sense of the highly technical and often obscure
58
Internal Revenue Code language.
This concept of expertise borrowing is worth bearing in mind as
we consider whether the Court’s pattern of reasoning is somehow
distinctive in federal tax decisions. With respect to language canon
usage, however, Professors Macey and Miller offer a theoretical
explanation, not an empirical assessment of the way the Court
actually performs when construing statutes in a technically complex
59
area. Further, in addressing the potential role of language canons,
Macey and Miller focus on error avoidance rather than expertise
60
borrowing. Although the avowedly content-neutral approach of
language canons may at times help to reduce the risk of error, a
court’s reliance on interpretive assets to borrow subject matter
expertise is more likely to occur with respect to substantive canons
and legislative history, which are openly policy based and content
driven.
At the same time, the possibility that the Court relies on
legislative history in its tax decisions to borrow expertise is just that—
a possibility. We noted how judges and scholars who defend
legislative history typically point to its value as a resource identifying
and describing the negotiated bargains that are an essential element

56. Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 2.
57. See infra Part III.A.2.
58. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Livingston, supra note 55, at 836.
59. See Macey & Miller, supra note 53, at 652–55, 667–71 (illustrating their argument with a
single Court decision, Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n Local Union No. 6,
493 U.S. 67 (1989)).
60. See id. at 662–64. Language canon reliance tends to promote error avoidance by
invoking a content-neutral rule or presumption that enables the Court not to engage the
substantive issues. By contrast, if the Court borrows expertise from an interpretive resource
such as Supreme Court precedent or legislative history, it is engaging the substantive subject
matter at stake. But some language canons, such as the whole code rule in tax cases, can
arguably be viewed as a form of second-order expertise borrowing. See text accompanying notes
276–80.

BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC

1248

5/5/2009 4:02:09 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1231

61

of congressional lawmaking. Our prior empirical findings supporting
this justification were based on the Court’s use of legislative history in
62
its workplace law decisions. In short, the prospect that the Justices
may invoke interpretive resources for distinctive reasons in the tax
and workplace law areas warrants detailed examination with
reference to both legislative history and the canons. Before
proceeding to that examination, we describe our two parallel datasets
of Supreme Court decisions.
B. Supreme Court Workplace Law and Tax Law Decisions
1. Workplace Statutes. Our workplace law dataset consists of
every Supreme Court merits decision from the fall of 1969 to the
spring of 2008 that construes one or more federal laws addressing an
63
aspect of the employment relationship. This universe features 597
64
decisions applying a range of congressional enactments. The largest
volume of cases involves union-management relations laws and race
or gender discrimination statutes, but there also are a considerable
number of decisions addressed to minimum wage and overtime
standards, safety and health, retirement benefits, discrimination based
on age or disability, and miscellaneous employment-related disputes

61. See sources cited supra note 52; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The
Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1420–23 (2003); Nourse & Schacter, supra note
32, at 607.
62. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 146–51; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear,
The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger
and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 227–28 (2006).
63. We have analyzed different aspects of this dataset—jointly and individually—in a
number of prior articles. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52 passim; James J. Brudney,
Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of Lords and the Supreme
Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 passim (2007); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 62 passim;
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18 passim. For a detailed discussion of how we assembled the
dataset, see Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 15–29. The complete dataset and codebook
for workplace decisions and tax decisions addressed in this Article are available on the web.
James Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices, http://www.psci.unt.edu/Ditslear/LH
data.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
64. The dataset also includes eighty-one decisions presenting workplace-related issues of
constitutional law that do not implicate any federal statute. We omit these decisions from our
analysis because we are comparing only the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation in
different subject matter areas. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 128 n.37 (discussing the
ways in which legislative history of statutes differs from “constitutional history” such as
convention proceedings, state ratification debates, and The Federalist Papers).
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arising in connection with criminal, tax, social security, or
65
immigration law.
To examine the rationales for each majority opinion, we identify
ten distinct interpretive resources on which the Court relies with
some frequency. In addition to legislative history, language canons,
and substantive canons, these include (i) the meaning of the textual
language and related appeals to plain or ordinary meaning, (ii)
dictionaries, (iii) legislative purpose, (iv) legislative inaction, (v)
Supreme Court precedent, (vi) common law precedent, and (vii)
66
agency deference. We omit items that the Justices rely on less
frequently, such as law review articles and treatises.
When reviewing each opinion, we identify the interpretive
resources being invoked and then determine whether a resource (a) is
merely referenced, which includes being mentioned in background
discussion or dismissed as substantively unpersuasive or (b) is relied
on as affirmatively probative to advance the outcome endorsed by the
majority author, which includes being invoked as “a” or “the”
67
determining factor in the majority’s reasoning process. Almost all
majority opinions rely on at least two of the ten listed interpretive
resources, and the vast majority rely on three or more resources to
help explain or justify their holdings.
We apply the same coding distinctions used for majority opinions
to identify the nature and extent of judicial reliance in all dissenting
opinions that include an elaboration of reasons. In addition, we
classify the votes by individual Justices for every decision, based on
whether a Justice authored or joined a majority or plurality, a
concurrence, a dissent, or some combination thereof. We are thus
able to group the dataset based on the size of the Court majority,
distinguishing close cases from decisions that are unanimous or nearly

65. For a fuller discussion of which statutes fall in each subject matter category, see
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 17–18. From the 1969 through the 2007 term, 192 of the
597 workplace law cases involved labor-management relations, 147 cases involved race or
gender discrimination statutes, 59 cases construed provisions involving other forms of status
discrimination (mostly age and disability), 74 cases addressed statutes setting minimum
workplace standards, 66 cases involved retirement-related statutes, 25 cases involved general
negligence-based provisions that apply primarily to workers in the railroad or maritime
industries, and 48 cases addressed miscellaneous employment-related provisions. This total
exceeds 597 because, in a number of cases, the Court construed statutes from more than one
category.
66. For a fuller discussion of how we identify these ten resources, see id. at 23–24.
67. For a fuller discussion of the rationale for this approach to judicial reasoning, as well as
challenges involved in distinguishing between reference and reliance, see id. at 25–26.
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unanimous. We also can identify patterns of reliance on specific
interpretive resources by individual Justices, including those who may
author a disproportionate number of majority opinions in a given
field.
2. Tax Statutes. Our tax law dataset consists of every Supreme
Court merits decision from 1969 to 2008 that involves the
interpretation of federal tax statutes. Although we compiled our
workplace law dataset from scratch, the collection of tax law decisions
borrows heavily from a database assembled by Professor Nancy
68
Staudt and a team of legal scholars and social scientists. Professor
Staudt and her colleagues searched broadly for Supreme Court
decisions mentioning the word “tax” but they retained only decisions
involving the interpretation of a federal tax statute, excluding all state
taxation cases as well as constitutional disputes that did not implicate
69
a federal statute.
Using the Staudt database, we identified 153 Supreme Court
cases decided between October 1969 and December 2005. Adopting
the Staudt selection criteria, we have added five cases decided by the
Court since January 2006. We then coded these 158 cases exactly as
we did the workplace law decisions, using the same ten interpretive
resources for majority and dissenting opinions, the same distinction
between referencing and relying on a resource, and the same
classification of votes by individual Justices for each decision.
Looking at respective contributions to the Court’s docket, we
note that the Justices address far more federal workplace law disputes
than federal tax controversies: they have decided nearly four times as
many workplace law cases in our thirty-nine-year period. This gap is
due in part to the sheer volume of major new workplace statutes,
targeting various specific subdivisions of the private and public
70
workforce and regulating a wide range of employment conditions.
68. See Staudt et al., supra note 13, at 1926–27. We are grateful to Professor Staudt and her
coauthors, Professors Lee Epstein, Peter Wiedenbeck, René Lindstädt, and Ryan J. Vander
Wielen, for providing us with their list of more than three hundred Supreme Court cases
decided between January 1950 and December 2005. One of us analyzed a limited subset of these
decisions in a prior article. See Brudney, supra note 63, at 29–35.
69. See Staudt et al., supra note 13, at 1927.
70. Among the federal statutes frequently applied by the Court are laws classified in Title
29 covering “Labor” (for example, the National Labor Relations Act, the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the
Employee Income Retirement Security Act, and the Worker Adjustment Retraining
Notification Act) but also laws codified as civil rights statutes under Title 42 (Title VII of the
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That volume in turn reflects the enduring importance of work in
modern American culture, and the Court’s related attentiveness to
continuing efforts by Congress and the president to reconcile
provision of employee rights with recognition of employer interests.
Conversely, despite the obvious importance of tax policy, the subject
receives less high-profile attention from Congress than does
workplace law. Congress has passed numerous statutes since 1970,
but it has not innovated in the tax law area the same way it has in the
71
workplace law area. In addition, the Justices may have less interest
in or understanding of tax law issues, a possibility we explore in Part
III.
The fact that congressional tax policy is set forth almost
exclusively within a single title of the U.S. Code does not mean,
however, that federal tax statutes are monolithic in nature. Like their
workplace counterparts, the tax laws encompass diverse substantive
72
issues, including core concepts such as defining taxable income and
73
and
identifying contours and limits of various deductions
74
exemptions. The tax code also includes a range of procedural
75
76
provisions implicating matters of jurisdiction, limitation periods,

1964 Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Civil War era statutes), as
well as laws addressed to specific industries or occupations (for example, federal civil service
laws under Title 5, the Mine Safety and Health Act under Title 30, the Longshore & Harbor
Workers Compensation Act under Title 33, the Davis-Bacon Act regulating construction
workers under Title 40, and the Railway Labor Act under Title 45) and a separate statute
regulating arbitration (the Federal Arbitration Act under Title 9).
71. See JOSHUA D. ROSENBERG & DOMINIC L. DAHER, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 11 (2008) (noting that Congress enacted its major Internal Revenue Code revisions
in 1939, 1954, and 1986); Nancy Staudt et al., The Ideological Component of Judging in the
Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1818 n.68 (2006) (noting that the code’s basic
structure has been unchanged since 1954). By contrast, Congress since 1960 has created entire
new areas of federal workplace law, regulating, inter alia, employment discrimination based on
race, sex, age, and disability; occupational safety and health; and employee pensions.
72. See, e.g., O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 81 (1996); Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S.
726, 728–29 (1989); Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 372 (1983); Comm’r v.
Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 82–83 (1977).
73. See, e.g., United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 825–26 (2001);
United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1991); United States v.
Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 595 (1986); Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm’r, 429 U.S. 569, 570
(1977).
74. See, e.g., Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 785 (2008); United States v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 352 (1988); United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 835–36
(1986); Paulsen v. Comm’r, 469 U.S. 131, 136–37 (1985).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1514 (2008);
Hinck v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2011, 2013 (2007); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005); Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 237 (1996).
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77

including criminal
and agency approaches to enforcement,
78
enforcement. We suggest in Part III that the Court’s distinctive uses
of legislative history and canons in its tax law cases relate to both
substantive and procedural decisions, although in somewhat different
ways.
Finally, there are thirteen decisions (two from the Burger era
and eleven from the Rehnquist years) that appear in both the
workplace and tax law datasets. We classify them as workplace law
decisions because they address the employment relationship, albeit in
79
ancillary form. They are part of our tax dataset because Professor
Staudt and her colleagues identified them based on her criteria. We
include them in our judicial reasoning analyses for both datasets
because they legitimately belong in each. Given the small number of
these cases, and their relatively representative character for our
judicial reasoning purposes, we see no risk of distortion from this
80
double counting.
II. RESULTS
A. Comparative Reliance on Legislative History and Canons over
Time
We begin with a broad comparison between the Court’s majority
reasoning in its tax and workplace law decisions. Table 1 reports the

76. See, e.g., EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1763, 1767–68 (2007);
United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 116 (2004); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347,
348–49 (1997); Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 389–90 (1984).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 276–78 (2002); Drye v. United States, 528
U.S. 49, 52 (1999); United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 519 (1998); United States v.
Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 355–56 (1989).
78. See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 11–14 (1980); United States v. Bishop,
412 U.S. 346, 347–48 (1973); Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 90 (1969).
79. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 324–27 (1995) (holding that the liquidated
damages portion of an employee’s age discrimination settlement is not excludable from gross
income for tax purposes); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992) (holding that back
pay awards under Title VII are not excludable from gross income); St. Martin’s Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981) (holding that parochial schools are
exempt from unemployment taxes under a statute’s exception for church employees).
80. Five of the thirteen majority opinions (38.5 percent) rely on legislative history, five rely
on language canons, and three (23.1 percent) rely on substantive canons. Further, three of the
six cases (50 percent) decided during Justice Blackmun’s tenure were authored by him. All of
these figures for duplicate cases are within two standard deviations from the mean of all cases,
which is the generally accepted line for outlier status, thus suggesting that their impact on the
larger analyses has not been skewed. See LARRY GONICK & WOOLLCOTT SMITH, THE
CARTOON GUIDE TO STATISTICS 18–26 (1993).
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extent to which the Court relies on our ten interpretive resources to
justify its holdings in these two subject matter areas. For each
resource, we report reliance as a percentage of the total number of
majority decisions in that area (158 in tax, 597 in workplace law) over
the thirty-nine Supreme Court terms.
Table 1: Mean Percent Reliance on Interpretive Resources in Tax
and Workplace Law Cases, 1969–2008
Resource
Tax (N=158)
Workplace (N=597)
Text
66.5
60.6
Dictionary
6.3
4.4
Language Canons*
29.7
20.8
Legislative History*
55.7
41.5
Legislative Purpose*
51.9
79.4
Legislative Inaction
5.7
6.4
Supreme Court Precedent
81.6
81.6
Common Law Precedent*
5.1
13.6
Substantive Canons
14.6
12.1
Agency Deference
19.0
18.9
*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace decisions.

These results indicate that the Court invokes a number of
important resources with comparable frequency when construing tax
and workplace statutes. For instance, the Justices relied on the
inherent or plain meaning of textual language in 66.5 percent of
majority tax opinions and 60.6 percent of their majorities in
workplace law. The extent of the Court’s reliance is virtually identical
with respect to agency deference (at 19 percent) and also Supreme
Court precedent (at 82 percent). The Court’s consistently high
dependence on its own case law presumably reflects two constants:
the parties’ contentions that some aspect of Court precedent supports
their position, and the Court’s institutional interest in enhancing
perceptions of stability and continuity by reference to its prior
81
decisions.
81. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword, A Judge on
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 30–31 (2002)
(emphasizing that judicial departures from precedent are the exception and should be made
explicit to promote confidence in a stable and predictable legal order); Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 286–87 (1990) (stating that
the Court’s respect for its own previous opinions is a key element of the judicial power
prescribed by the Constitution); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983) (observing that the institutional strength of the judiciary is linked to
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At the same time, the Court in tax law decisions relies
significantly more on both legislative history and language canons—
and somewhat more on substantive canons—than it does in labor and
82
employment cases. Given the persistence of ideologically tinged
tensions between the canons and legislative history in the workplace
83
law area, it is intriguing that tax law majorities rely so much more
often on both the semantic resource of language canons and the
political resource of legislative history. Both of these interpretive
assets encompass a highly specified and discrete set of components.
Legislative history includes nine basic types of particular legislative
84
record documents, and language canons incorporate a larger but still
85
identifiable list of particular semantic or structural maxims.
By contrast, the Court relies significantly less on legislative
86
purpose in tax law than in workplace law. That the Justices invoke

the public perception of judges deciding like cases in the same way). See generally ROSCOE
POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923) (describing law’s challenge to
reconcile the need for stability and the need for change).
82. The use of “significant” refers to results that are statistically significant using a twotailed t-test for difference of means. A result that is significant at the .05 level (Pr(|T|>|t|) ≤ .05)
has no more than a 5 percent chance of occurring purely as a coincidence. R. MARK SIRKIN,
STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 178–89 (1995). All statistical analyses in this Article are
run using Stata version 8. For simplicity, we refer to each result in this Article as “t=.xxx,”
although the notation set forth above (Pr|T|>|t|) is more complete in that all reported values are
probabilities of the t-value being based on chance. The differences identified in text are highly
significant for both legislative history (t = .001) and language canons (t = .008); the difference is
not significant for substantive canons (t = .200).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 35–37, 51–52.
84. The nine basic subsets for which we coded are House bills, Senate bills, House
committee hearings, Senate committee hearings, House standing committee reports, Senate
standing committee reports, House floor debates, Senate floor debates, and conference
committee reports. Other legislative record documents (for example, joint committee reports,
joint resolutions, presidential veto messages) are used less often by the Justices.
85. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, app. B at 19–23, 25–27. The language canons
principally relied on by the Supreme Court are a subset of those listed in Appendix B—notably
expressio unius, noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, the whole act rule and its “cousins” the
presumption against redundancy and the presumption to avoid surplusage, the presumption of
consistent usage of a term throughout the statute, and in pari materia.
86. This difference is again highly significant (t = .000). The Court’s reliance on common
law precedent also differs significantly between tax and workplace law, but we do not focus on it
in our discussion. The Court’s reliance on common law precedent in tax law is truly rare—lower
than for any other resource. But see, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15, 19 (1980)
(construing a criminal statutory provision of the Internal Revenue Code in light of former
common law distinctions between principals and accessories); United States v. Euge, 444 U.S.
707, 712 (1980) (analogizing the taxpayer duty to comply with an IRS summons to the commonlaw duties attached to the issuance of a testimonial summons). The Court’s greater reliance in
workplace law (still only 13.6 percent) is driven by a very high reliance on common law
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considerations of purpose in four-fifths of their workplace law
majorities stems in part from this resource’s soft and rather expansive
boundaries. Unlike our coding of language canons and legislative
history, in which we require the Court to refer to particular maxims
or specific congressional documents, we code legislative purpose
based on the Court’s more open-ended reference to policies or values
87
that the statute is meant to protect or goals that Congress must have
88
had in mind. The inferential nature of such attributions broadens the
domain of this interpretive asset in workplace law, in which remedial
policies and redistributive goals are regarded as integral to
congressional motivation, at least for the enacting coalition. This kind
of explicitly purposive cross-referencing by the Court is somewhat
less prevalent when it comes to tax statutes. The difference may arise
because the Justices are not familiar or comfortable enough with the
underlying tax policies to impute them to Congress on such a regular
89
basis. Further, the Court’s greater reliance on specifically delineated
resources like language canons and legislative history in tax cases may
reduce the appeal of pursuing amorphous considerations of legislative
90
purpose.
Our principal focus is on legislative history and the canons. Table
2 breaks down the Court’s pattern of reliance over time for those
precedent for general negligence statutes (50 percent) along with an above-average reliance for
retirement-related laws (27.5 percent) and labor relations statutes (20.2 percent).
87. See, e.g., Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 558–60 (1997) (relying on
statutory purpose in the workplace context); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507
U.S. 546, 565 (1993) (relying on statutory purpose in the tax context).
88. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231–34 (2000) (relying on the purpose
imputed to Congress in the workplace context); United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224, 240 (1994)
(relying on the purpose imputed to Congress in the tax context).
89. Policy preferences are embedded in tax statutes: even an avowedly revenue-neutral law
like the Tax Reform Act of 1986 features important policy choices. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at
62 (1985) (reporting the estimated revenue-neutral effect); id. at 94 (discussing reasons for
expanding earned income credit); id. at 82–89 (discussing reasons for adjusting marginal tax
rates). And there are a substantial number of tax majority opinions that explain tax policies or
concepts by imputing purposive considerations to Congress. See, e.g., Irvine, 511 U.S. at 234, 240
(discussing the purpose behind a code provision addressing the federal gift tax treatment of
disclaimers); Comm’r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) (discussing the purpose behind
the code provision regulating depreciation of capital equipment). Still, our suggestion in the text
is meant to help explain why purpose is invoked in only one-half of the tax majority opinions
(51.9 percent) as opposed to four-fifths of the workplace law majorities (79.4 percent). That the
Court relies significantly more often on purpose in workplace law majorities may well reflect the
Justices’ greater levels of confidence when explaining and amplifying workplace policies. See
generally infra Part III.
90. For a discussion of why tax law decisions feature distinctive kinds of reliance on
legislative history and language canons, see infra Parts III.A–B.
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resources, along with text and legislative purpose, by distinguishing
between the Burger Court era and the Rehnquist/Roberts years.
These results suggest that the Court’s reasoning approach has
evolved in two distinct ways. First, key differences between tax law
and workplace law reasoning during the Burger period have
narrowed since 1987. In the Burger years, the Justices were
significantly more likely to rely on both text and language canons in
tax cases than in workplace decisions; those discrepancies are no
longer significant for cases decided during the Rehnquist/Roberts era.
The Court’s propensity in tax cases to invoke legislative history more,
and legislative purpose less, than in workplace decisions remains
significant across both periods. But the convergence of the Justices’
reliance on the two major textualist resources—even as reliance on
each resource has increased over time—suggests that the Court has
adopted a more uniform approach to semantic reasoning.
Table 2: Reliance on Selected Interpretive Resources—Burger Court
Decisions and Rehnquist/Roberts Court Decisions
Resource
Burger Court
Text*
Language Canons*
Legislative History*
Legislative Purpose*
Substantive Canons

Tax Percentage
(N=86)
64.0
26.7
62.8#
53.5
12.8

Workplace Percentage
(N=301)
54.2#
14.0#
52.2#
85.7#
8.6#

Rehnquist/Roberts Court
(N=72)
(N=296)
Text
69.4
67.2#
Language Canons
33.3
27.7#
Legislative History*
47.2#
30.7#
Legislative Purpose*
50.0
73.0#
Substantive Canons
16.7
15.5#
*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace law decisions.
#Indicates significant difference between Burger Court and Rehnquist/Roberts court
decisions.

Second, the Court’s reliance on key resources is more volatile
over time in workplace law than in tax law. For labor and
employment decisions, reliance on all five of the resources listed in
Table 2 changed dramatically between the Burger era and the
Rehnquist/Roberts years: the Justices’ use of text, language canons,
and substantive canons significantly increased, whereas their use of
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legislative history and legislative purpose significantly decreased. By
contrast, the only significant change between eras in the Court’s use
of resources for tax cases involved the declining use of legislative
history. The lack of significant change in reliance on text, language
canons, substantive canons, and legislative purpose reflects a greater
continuity in methodological approach with regard to tax decisions.
Relatedly, whereas we previously found an ideological tension
between majority use of canons and dissent reliance on legislative
91
history in workplace law cases during the Rehnquist years, this
tension is absent from the Justices’ relatively stable use of those
92
resources in tax law cases. The Justices’ unwillingness to use the
canons in such an instrumental or policy-conscious manner is
consistent with the contention that tax law and tax litigation in
general are not as ideologically focused or divisive as workplace law.

91. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37.
92. Indeed, there are only two Rehnquist-era tax decisions in which the majority relies on
canons but not legislative history while the dissent relies on legislative history: Commissioner v.
Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996) (a progovernment decision) and Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534
U.S. 438 (2002) (a protaxpayer decision). By contrast, there are sixteen such workplace law
decisions during the Rehnquist era, including the Sigmon Coal case, which is also in the tax
dataset. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 68. During the Burger era this tension
between canons and legislative history was not a factor; there were three workplace decisions
and three tax decisions in which the majority relied on canons but not legislative history while
the dissent relied on legislative history. Id. (noting the existence of three workplace decisions).
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Trends in Reliance: Legislative History and Canons,
Majority Opinions 1969–2008
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Still, a key theme across subject matter areas is that the Court’s
reliance on legislative history has declined and its reliance on canons
93
has increased, as shown in the graph above. Indeed, there has been a
precipitous decline in legislative history usage for tax decisions in the
past decade, eliminating the differential in reliance on that resource
between tax and workplace law cases.
A final element of our overview of the differences between tax
law and workplace law reasoning involves the possibility that the
Court may be more closely divided in one area than the other. To
explore this possibility, we grouped each dataset into four categories,
depending on whether the Court’s decision (i) was unanimous (zero
dissenters); (ii) enjoyed a wide margin of support (vote differential of
five, six, or seven); (iii) was supported by a moderate-size majority
(vote margin of three or four); or (iv) was a close case (vote margin of
93. For this graph, we grouped cases by ten-year intervals. Thus, for instance, for the
period from 1979–88, the Court relied on legislative history in 66 percent of its tax majorities
and 54 percent of its workplace majorities; it relied on canons in 38 percent of its tax majorities
and 21 percent of its workplace majorities. Although the same trends occur when measured at
eight-year or five-year intervals, the normal fluctuations in intervals smaller than ten years
resulted in largely incomprehensible graphs.
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one of two). Table 3 reports the size of majorities for tax and
workplace law cases over the entire thirty-nine year period.
Table 3: Comparing the Size of Majority Opinion Margins,
1969–2008
Size of Majority

Tax Majorities Percentage
Workplace Majorities
(N=158)
Percentage (N=597)
Unanimous
42.4
42.7
Wide*
26.0
19.1
Moderate
21.5
16.8
Close*
10.1
21.4
*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace decisions.

Tax law decisions are significantly less likely to be close cases
and significantly more likely to be decided by a wide margin
(meaning either one or two dissenting votes). Remarkably, there have
been only two close tax law cases in the entire Rehnquist/Roberts
period, whereas almost one-fifth of all workplace law cases were close
94
during this same period. The differential on close cases further
contributes to the impression that tax law cases are less ideologically
95
divisive then their workplace law counterparts.
We also examined the proportion of close cases for each subject
area in which the majority invokes legislative history, language
canons, or substantive canons. We found that the Court relies on
legislative history significantly more often in close workplace law
cases than in all other workplace decisions, and the Court’s added
reliance on substantive canons in close workplace law decisions

94. The exact differential is 2.8 percent versus 19.2 percent, which is highly significant (t =
.0003). During the Burger era, tax law decisions were close 16.3 percent of the time, whereas
workplace law cases were close 23.6 percent of the time; that difference only approaches
significance (t = .075).
95. There is some debate among tax law scholars about whether and in what ways federal
judges may be ideologically divided in this area. See, e.g., Staudt et al., supra note 71, at 1815–21
(finding that Justices’ political preferences have explanatory value for the subset of Supreme
Court decisions involving corporate taxpayers but not for the subset involving individual
taxpayers); Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins
Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?, 25 VA. TAX.
REV. 201, 204, 237 (2005) (finding that appellate judges appointed by Democratic presidents are
more likely to issue protaxpayer decisions in certain settings). We do not explore the influence
of judicial ideology in this Article not only for reasons of space but also based on lingering
doubts as to a proper classification approach. See generally infra note 289. Still, given that only
one in ten tax cases is closely decided and more than two-thirds are unanimous or have at most
two dissents, the area does appear less divisive than workplace law.
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96

approaches significance. By contrast, the Court’s reliance on
legislative history, substantive canons, and language canons in close
tax law cases versus all others does not even approach being
97
significant. The fact that legislative history is disproportionately
invoked in 5–4 workplace decisions—but not in closely divided tax
cases—suggests that the Justices are comfortable seeking guidance
from such history when they have strong disagreements about the
meaning of workplace law text. This variation with respect to close
cases points toward an important difference in legislative history
justifications between tax and workplace law decisions.
B. Comparing Reliance on Types of Legislative History
In previous articles analyzing the role of legislative history in
workplace law cases, we determined that the Court regularly relied
on this history to help illuminate or explain the details of legislative
98
bargains. Our findings focused on the eight most liberal Justices and
how often they invoked legislative history to identify or describe
these bargains, including compromises that supported results
99
inconsistent with their presumed policy preferences. Other scholars
have recognized the importance of legislative history to reflect or
elaborate on the negotiated deals that are integral to congressional
100
lawmaking.
Legislative history’s role in capturing elements of this
dealmaking may be especially robust in certain ideologically charged
areas of substantive law, where bill managers and principal sponsors
agree to postintroduction changes to build majority support or
overcome a filibuster. Labor relations and civil rights are two
examples, but environmental law is another field in which such

96. For reliance on legislative history, the difference is 51percent in close cases versus 39
percent in all others (t = .008). For reliance on substantive canons, the difference is 16 percent in
close cases versus 11 percent in all others (t = .052).
97. Complete results for these analyses are on file with the Duke Law Journal.
98. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 146–60; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 62,
at 226–28.
99. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 137–60.
100. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 32, at 607; Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 61, at 1420–
23.
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tradeoffs or compromises are relatively common and are often
101
reflected in legislative history.
Not every area of federal law is as ideological or partisan as labor
relations and civil rights. In this regard, we have observed that the
Court’s general approach and reasoning in tax law cases seem less
policy oriented and less polarized than its treatment of workplace
law. The Justices issue far fewer closely divided decisions in tax law,
their reasoning patterns are more stable or consistent between major
time periods, and they pay notably less attention to broad
102
considerations of congressional purpose.
Given these initial
findings, plus the fact that tax law involves more technically complex
and specialized concepts than most other areas of federal law, it is
reasonable to consider whether the Court relies on legislative history
in the tax area for distinct reasons—specifically to borrow expertise
from knowledgeable congressional sources rather than primarily to
identify the legislative bargain reached by competing interested
parties.
With this expertise-borrowing hypothesis in mind, we identify
ten different types of legislative history on which the Justices rely
when their decisions feature majority use of legislative history. Table
4 reports findings for our two subject matter areas.

101. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61–
63 (1987); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125–29 (1985); Train
v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 11–23 (1976).
102. See supra Table 2: Reliance on Selected Interpretive Resources—Burger Court
Decisions and Rehnquist/Roberts Court Decisions, Table 3: Comparing Size of Majority
Opinion Margins, 1969–2008 and accompanying text.
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Table 4: Mean Percent Reliance on Legislative History Sources
When Legislative History Is Present, 1969–2008
Resource
Tax (N=88)
Workplace (N=247)
House Committee Report*
68.2
56.9
Sen. Committee Report*
78.4
54.0
Conference Committee Report*
14.8
26.6
House Floor Debate*
12.5
30.2
Senate Floor Debate*
14.8
53.6
House Hearing
11.4
15.3
Senate Hearing
17.0
14.5
House Bill
3.4
6.9
Senate Bill
4.5
8.9
Other Legislative History
14.8
22.6
*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace decisions.

These results support our theory that the Court is more inclined
to invoke legislative history for expertise-borrowing reasons in tax
law cases but more apt to use that history to explain legislative
compromises in workplace law decisions. The Justices are
significantly more likely to invoke floor debates and conference
committee reports in their workplace law decisions than in tax law
103
opinions. These forms of legislative record evidence tend to address
changes in text that are agreed to between introduction and
enactment: amendments and failed amendments proposed on the
floor to alter the text approved by a standing committee, and
conference committee action reconciling the different versions of text
approved by the two chambers. Such legislative history, narrating and
accompanying a bill’s internal progress toward congressional
approval, is useful principally to help understand the components and
implications of the final legislative deal.
On the other hand, the Justices are significantly more likely to
rely on House and Senate standing committee reports in tax opinions

103. For House and Senate floor debates, the differences are significant not only over the
entire thirty-nine-year period but also in both the Burger era and the Rehnquist/Roberts years.
For conference committee reports, the differences approach significance in both the Burger era
(t = .052) and the Rehnquist/Roberts years (t = .059). In addition, Senate bill language is relied
on more often in workplace than in tax cases; this difference approaches significance for the
thirty-nine-year period (t = .097) and also the Burger era (t = .064).
The subset of “other legislative history”—notably reports by joint or advisory
committees, special commissions, and executive agencies, as well as postenactment history or
“constitutional history” from eighteenth or nineteenth century debates—also is used more often
in workplace law cases; this difference approaches significance (t = .060).
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104

than is true for workplace law decisions. Indeed, there is a striking
disparity in tax cases between the Court’s reliance on standing
committee reports and any other legislative history sources. As the
following graph indicates, the Justices invoke these committee reports
in their tax majorities five to six times more often than records of
105
hearings, floor debates, or conference committee deliberations. We
106
observed in Part I.A that the reports issued by the House and
Senate standing committees—reports drafted primarily by the staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation—are a key source of technical and
specialized knowledge in producing and explaining tax legislation.
The Court’s extraordinarily high reliance on reports from those
standing committees suggests a judicial mindset oriented toward
expertise borrowing.
We are not contending that the Justices invoke legislative history
in a given case simply to borrow expertise or solely to help explain a
bargain. The Court generally includes two or more different kinds of
107
legislative record documents as part of its workplace law reasoning;
in doing so, the Court may well be benefitting from expert
contributions as well as describing the deal.

104. For Senate committee reports, the difference is significant both in the Burger era
(t = .000) and during the Rehnquist/Roberts years (t = .027). For House Committee reports, the
difference is significant in the Burger era (t = 0.32).
105. In workplace law cases, the Justices rely on committee reports two to three times more
often than most other legislative record documents—and they invoke Senate floor debates
virtually the same amount as committee reports.
106. See supra Part I.A.3.
107. The Court relies on almost three legislative record sources for each workplace law
decision invoking legislative history, but on less than 2.5 sources in each tax law case. This
difference (a 2.90 mean versus a 2.40 mean) is highly significant for the thirty-nine year period (t
= .004); it also is significant for both the Burger years (t = .030) and the Rehnquist/Roberts era (t
= .018).
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Supreme Court Reliance on Types of Legislative
108
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Further, the Court relies on standing committee reports from each
chamber more than half the time in workplace law as well as tax law
decisions, and those reports sometimes describe or elaborate on
legislative bargains as well as explaining complex or technical aspects
of text. Still, the Court’s pattern of reliance in tax cases—invoking
committee reports three-fourths of the time but largely ignoring other
documents on which it so often relies in workplace decisions—
suggests that something distinctive takes place in the tax law area.
In considering the different functions that legislative history may
serve in tax and workplace decisions, we also examined how often
dissent reliance on legislative history accompanies majority reliance
on that history. We determined that when the majority invokes
legislative history in its nonunanimous workplace law decisions, the
dissent is significantly more likely to use legislative history than when
109
such history is not part of the majority’s reasoning. It may be that
108. For identification of the principal types of legislative history that we coded, see supra
note 84.
109. The likelihood is highly significant for the Burger years (t = .000), the
Rehnquist/Roberts years (t = .000), and the entire thirty-nine-year period (t = .000).
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the Justices are prepared to argue about what exactly the legislative
deal or bargain was because the legislative record contains plausible
110
(at least to the Justices) competing understandings. For tax law
decisions relying on legislative history, however, the likelihood of
111
dissent reliance on legislative history is not close to significant.
Table 5 reports the percentage of decisions for both subject areas in
which the majority’s reliance on legislative history in nonunanimous
decisions is accompanied by dissent use of legislative history.
Table 5: Comparing Frequency of Legislative History Reliance in
Both Majority and Dissent for Nonunanimous Cases
Percent of All Years (Tax N=51; Workplace N=162)
Percent of Burger Years (Tax N=35; Workplace N=109)
Percent of Rehnquist/Roberts Years (Tax N=16; Workplace N=53)

Tax
35*
40*
25*

Workplace
62
65
55

*Indicates significant difference between tax and workplace decisions.

The Justices disagree far less about the meaning of legislative history
in tax cases than in workplace decisions. This conclusion is consistent
with our theory that the Justices’ use of tax legislative history is more
about borrowing expertise than understanding the bargain. It seems
reasonable to infer that the Justices’ infrequent level of disagreement
about legislative history in tax cases is due in part to a comparatively
modest level of contested understandings among key congressional
actors about the evolving meaning of text from bill introduction to
enactment. The accompanying tax legislative history—especially
committee reports on which the Justices so heavily rely—is therefore
more likely to focus on explicating the arcane and technical substance
of tax law. Conversely, the Justices’ tendency to disagree about the
meaning of legislative history in workplace law cases, and to invoke
documents from multiple stages of the legislative process to buttress
their respective positions, suggests that the Justices’ focus in these
cases is on understanding the legislative bargain.

110. Apart from the floor debates and conference committee reports discussed, see supra
note 103 and accompanying text, another possible source for these competing understandings is
standing committee reports that include extensive minority views. These minority views are
present far more often in committee reports accompanying workplace statutes than reports
accompanying tax statutes. See infra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
111. The likelihood is not close to significant for the thirty-nine-year period (t = .41), nor is it
close to significant for the Burger period (t = .46) or the Rehnquist/Roberts years (t = .43).
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C. Comparing Reliance on Types of Language and Substantive
Canons
As discussed in Section A, the Court has relied increasingly on
language canons and substantive canons to help explain or justify its
112
tax and workplace law decisions. Although the Justices’ use of the
canons has expanded dramatically in the workplace law area, reliance
on both language and substantive canons remains somewhat higher
for tax cases than workplace decisions. In this Section, we address
certain subsets of language and substantive canons invoked by the
Justices in their tax and workplace law opinions. Our interest here is
in whether—as appears true for legislative history—the Court uses
canons in somewhat different ways for each subject area, and, if so,
what factors might explain or account for this variation.
For these purposes, we have grouped language canons into two
categories: (i) presumptions about the meaning attributed to
113
individual words or the linguistic inferences to be drawn from how
those words are included, omitted, or arranged in a single phrase or
114
sentence; and (ii) presumptions about the larger cohesion or
structural integrity of the text, including especially the whole act rule
and the related presumption against surplusage, and also
presumptions about the relationship between words used more than
115
once in different parts of the same statute or in similar statutes.
Table 6 reports our findings in the two subject matter areas,
separating the two subsets of language canons for all cases that
involve majority reliance on language canons.

112. See supra Table 2: Reliance on Selected Interpretive Resources—Burger Court
Decisions and Rehnquist/Roberts Court Decisions, Table 3: Comparing Size of Majority
Opinion Margins, 1969–2008 and accompanying text.
113. We refer here primarily to the plain meaning rule, the presumption to follow ordinary
rather than technical usage of terms, and the distinction between “may” and “shall.”
114. We refer here to maxims such as expressio unius, ejusdem generis, and noscitur a sociis.
115. We refer here to the presumption of statutory consistency (the same or similar terms in
a statute should be interpreted the same way), the rule of in pari materia (similar statutory
provisions in two comparable statutes should be applied in the same way), and the presumption
that when two statutory provisions conflict the specific provision controls the general.
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Table 6: Mean Percent Reliance on Language Canon Subsets
when Language Canons are Present, 1969–2008*
Years
Tax
All Years (N=47)
Burger Years (N=23)
Rehnquist/Roberts Years (N=24)
Workplace
All Years (N=123)
Burger Years (N=42)
Rehnquist/Roberts Years (N=81)

Individual Words
or Sentences

Structural Cohesion
or Integrity

17.0 (8 of 47)
17.4 (4 of 23)
16.7 (4 of 24)

91.5 (43 of 47)
87.0 (20 of 23)
95.8 (23 of 24)

34.1 (42 of 123)
28.6 (12 of 42)
37.0 (30 of 81)

75.6 (93 of 123)
78.6 (33 of 42)
74.1 (60 of 81)

*Percentages in each row add up to more than 100 because some cases rely on both
types of canons.

Although the number of majority opinions relying on language
canons is only about one-half the number that rely on legislative
116
history, certain interesting differences emerge between tax law and
workplace law cases. The Court is significantly more likely to invoke
structural cohesion canons and significantly less likely to rely on
word- or sentence-meaning canons in its tax decisions than in its
workplace law majorities. The Court’s heavier reliance on structural
canons in tax cases stems primarily from shifts in use arising since
117
1986. Put differently, the Court relies on structural canons five to six
times more often than word- or sentence-meaning canons in tax
majorities, whereas the ratio is only two or three to one in workplace
law majorities.
One possible explanation for the Court’s tilt toward structural
canons in the tax area involves the unified and self-contained nature
of American tax laws. Virtually all revenue statutes reviewed by the
Court exist as additions or revisions to a single title of the U.S.
118
Code. The Justices may well believe, even if subconsciously, that

116. In its tax law cases, the Court relied on legislative history in 89 majorities but on
language canons in 48; in its workplace law cases the Court invoked legislative history in 247
majorities and invoked language canons in 123 decisions. Although the lower sample size makes
it harder to obtain statistical significance, see GONICK & SMITH, supra note 80, at 146–50, our
key findings with respect to both language canons and substantive canons are significant.
117. For structural canons, the difference in reliance between tax and workplace cases is not
significant during the Burger years (t = .351) but is highly significant for the Rehnquist/Roberts
period (t = .008).
118. We refer to Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code. Occasionally tax cases arise under
Title 11, the bankruptcy code, or Title 29, which contains ERISA. But the overwhelming
majority of federal taxation cases arise under Title 26.
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presumptions about structural integrity—such as interpreting terms
consistently or avoiding redundancies—deserve special respect in a
regulatory scheme that is continuously amended and highly self119
referential.
On the other hand, workplace law statutes are more likely to be
discrete and separate entities, located in numerous different titles of
120
the U.S. Code. The Court is still committed to invoking structural
integrity canons to help resolve the meaning of inconclusive text. But
the presence of so many relatively minor workplace statutes,
121
including many that are in essence “one-off” enactments, may have
led the Justices to rely more often on narrower language-based
maxims that address the meaning of individual words or sentences
within each body of enacted text.
Turning to the substantive canons, we group these into two
categories as well. The first category consists of policy norms based
on generally applicable legal principles such as presumptions to avoid
constitutional issues or repeals by implication and rules disfavoring
federal preemption of core state functions or implied waivers of
sovereign immunity. The second category consists of policy norms
grounded in particular subject matter policies such as presumptions
favoring labor arbitration or respect for international maritime trade
and presumptions disfavoring implied tax exemptions or restrictions
on the Internal Revenue Services’s (IRS) summons power. Table 7
reports our findings, separating reliance on these two subsets of
substantive canons for all decisions that rely on substantive canons.

119. See, e.g., ROSENBERG & DAHER, supra note 71, at 11 (observing that the major code
revisions occurred in 1939, 1954, and 1986, but that Congress has enacted code amendments
almost every year); RICHARD GERSHON, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE § 1.02, at 2 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing Congress’s regular amendments to the 1986 code,
including “fairly major changes” in 1991, 1993, and 1996); see also Richard L. Doernberg & Fred
S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 895 (1987) (book review) (referring to dozens of revisions in the code since
its birth in 1913, and adding that from 1976 to 1984, “six different tax bills each affected more
provisions than the 1969 [Reform] Act, even though none of these acts purported to reorganize
the Code”).
120. For a list of workplace statutes found in eight separate titles of the U.S. Code, see supra
note 70.
121. Examples of these one-off enactments are the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the
Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification Act, and until 2008 the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Even regulatory schemes amended several times, such as the National Labor Relations Act
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, do not compare with the Internal Revenue
Code, which is amended on an almost annual basis. See supra note 119.
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Because the overall number of cases invoking substantive canons is
relatively small, we do not break them down between the two eras.
Table 7: Mean Percent Reliance on Substantive Canon Subsets
when Substantive Canons are Present, 1969–2008*
Percent of All Years, Tax (N=24)
Percent of All Years, Workplace (N=78)

General
Applicability
66.7 (16 of 24)
93.2 (68 of 73)

Subject Matter
Specific
45.8 (11 of 24)
6.8 (5 of 73)

*Percentages in each row may add up to more than 100 because some cases rely on both
types of canons.

Once again, there are notable differences between the types of
canons relied on in tax and workplace law. The Court in both areas
relies heavily on substantive canons of general application. The
Justices invoke the constitutional avoidance canon and the canon
122
disfavoring implied repeals somewhat more often in tax cases, while
relying far more on presumptions against waiving sovereign immunity
123
and against preempting core state functions in workplace law.
The most striking distinction, however, involves how often the
Court invokes judicial policy norms tailored to particular statutory
subject matter. The Justices rely on tax-based canons in almost half
the tax decisions in which they invoke substantive canons, but they
turn to canons grounded in particular workplace-related issues in only
124
7 percent of the workplace cases in which they use canons. The
heavy focus on tax-specific substantive canons can be seen as a form
of expertise borrowing, albeit less direct or rigorous than reliance on
tax legislative history. The Justices may invoke policy norms like
construing exceptions against the taxpayer or favoring the IRS’s
summons power to support if not shape their responses to difficult
doctrinal issues of tax law. They may well feel less need to make use
of such targeted policy presumptions in workplace law because they

122. The Court’s use of the constitutional avoidance canon in tax decisions that rely on
substantive canons is 16.7 percent (four of twenty-four cases) whereas in workplace law it is 12.3
percent (nine of seventy-three cases). The Court’s use of the implied repeals canon in tax cases
is 12.5 percent (three of twenty-four cases) whereas in workplace law it is 8.2 percent (six of
seventy-three cases).
123. The Court in its workplace law decisions has relied on the sovereign immunity canon in
eight majorities and the presumption against preemption in ten decisions. See Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 18, at 106 nn.438–39 (discussing six cases invoking the antipreemption
canon). The Court in its tax law majorities has relied on either of the two canons in only one
decision.
124. This difference in the use of subject-specific canons is highly significant (t = .000).
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are more confident in their ability to resolve the underlying doctrinal
questions.
D. Justice Blackmun’s Impact in Tax Cases
Individual Justices typically acquire diverse background
experiences and considerable areas of expertise by the time they
reach the Supreme Court. Justices Marshall and Ginsburg spent many
years planning and litigating important employment discrimination
125
Justices Breyer and Scalia taught
and civil rights cases.
administrative law and wrote about that subject in depth from a
126
scholarly vantage point. Justice Blackmun was an accomplished tax
lawyer for more than two decades before his appointment to the
Eighth Circuit in 1959. During sixteen years with a private firm in
127
Minneapolis and nine years as general counsel to the Mayo Clinic,
Blackmun not only practiced federal and state tax law; he also gave
speeches and wrote articles reflecting his abiding interest in and
128
knowledge of the field.
Justice Blackmun’s area of expertise seems to have dramatically
impacted his majority opinion assignments. Table 8 lists the four most
prolific majority opinion writers in tax and workplace law. We

125. See RANDALL W. BLAND, JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL: CRUSADER FOR
LIBERALISM 30–177 (2001) (discussing Justice Marshall’s central role in litigating race
discrimination lawsuits from 1934 to 1960); Neal A. Lewis, High Court Nominee Faces Easy
Road Through Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993, at A15 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s role as a
leading litigator for women’s rights).
126. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM passim (1982);
Antonin Scalia, Separation of Functions: Obscurity Preserved, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. v passim
(1982); see also Cindy Skrzycki, Interest Grows in Resurrecting Administrative Conference,
WASH. POST, May 25, 2004, at E1 (describing Justices Scalia and Breyer as influential members
of the Administrative Conference of the United States during their careers as law professors).
127. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER JUSTICE 40–62
(2008) (discussing Justice Blackmun’s career in a Minneapolis law firm from 1934 to 1950 and at
the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota from 1950 to 1959); Nomination of Harry A.
Blackmun, of Minnesota, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 7 (1970) (identifying Blackmun’s
professional background from 1934–59).
128. For speeches and panel appearances, see, for example, Blackmun Talks to Junior Bar
on Income Tax Returns, HENNEPIN LAW., Feb. 23, 1939, at 6 (on file with the Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 12 [hereinafter Blackmun
Papers]); Blackmun Named to Expert Panel, ROCHESTER POST BULLETIN, Oct. 5, 1953 (on file
with the Blackmun Papers, supra, Box 12). For articles, see, for example, Harry A. Blackmun,
The Marital Deduction and Its Use in Minnesota, 36 MINN. L. REV. 50 (1951); Harry A.
Blackmun, The Physician and His Estate, 36 MINN. MED. 1033 (1953); Harry A. Blackmun,
Federal Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates, 33 MINN. L. REV. 800 (1949) (book review).
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calculated the Justices’ rankings based on the percentage of the
Court’s tax or workplace decisions they authored during their
129
tenure.
Table 8: Percentage of Majority Opinions Authored by the Four
Most Prolific Justices in Tax and Workplace Law during Their
Tenure on the Court
Tax Majorities
Workplace Majorities
Blackmun
30.4 (34 of 112)
Brennan
16.5 (62 of 376)
Souter
18.8 (9 of 48)
Stewart
14.4 (27 of 188)
Marshall
16.5 (18 of 109)
White
14.1 (59 of 418)
Powell
13.7 (10 of 73)
Thomas
14.0 (25 of 178)
Justice Blackmun authored over 30 percent of all signed majority
opinions in tax law during his twenty-four years of service. This
proportion of the Court’s tax majorities is almost double that assigned
to his nearest colleagues in tax law cases, Justices Souter and
Marshall. It also is close to twice the proportion of workplace law
majorities written by Justice Brennan, who was assigned more
130
workplace law decisions than any other Justice. Blackmun authored
a remarkable 40 percent of the federal tax decisions in which he voted
for the majority result, and he wrote concurring opinions in an
131
additional 7 percent of those decisions. Another way to understand
Blackmun’s domination of the tax law area is to observe that in his
twenty-four terms on the Court, he wrote as many tax majorities as
were authored collectively by five other Justices—Brennan, White,
Stevens, Rehnquist, and Scalia—who on average served over twenty132
six terms within our dataset.
129. Each Justice authored at least nine majorities in tax law or workplace law. We excluded
from our calculations the five per curiam decisions in tax law and the twenty-one per curiam
statutory opinions in workplace law.
130. As the senior Associate Justice for fifteen terms (1975–76 through 1989–90), Justice
Brennan would have assigned himself many of these workplace majorities. Justice Blackmun
was senior Associate Justice for only his final term (1993–94) and would therefore have been
assigned almost all of his tax majorities by others.
131. The exact figures are 39.1 percent (34 of 87) and 6.9 percent (6 of 87). The next highest
Justice in tax decisions is Souter, who wrote 20.9 percent of the decisions in which he voted with
the majority (9 of 43) and also authored concurrences in 7.0 percent of those cases (3 of 43). In
workplace law, Brennan wrote 21.9 percent of the decisions in which he voted with the majority
(62 of 283), and he wrote concurrences in another 8.5 percent (24 of 283).
132. Justice Brennan wrote eleven tax majorities from 1969–70 to 1989–90; Justice White
wrote eight majorities from 1969–70 to 1992–93; Justice Stevens wrote seven majorities from
1975–76 to 2007–08; Justice Rehnquist wrote five majorities from 1971–72 to 2004–05; Justice
Scalia wrote three majorities from 1986–87 to 2007–08.
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Justice Blackmun’s unusual influence in the tax law area extends
beyond his role in majority decisions. He also authored seventeen
dissents—more than any other Justice during his twenty-four terms
on the Court. Indeed, Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in over
one-third of the nonunanimous tax decisions in which he had not
133
authored the majority opinion. In addition, the Court issued five per
curiam tax opinions, based only on the certiorari papers, between
1970 and 1994. Blackmun authored three of these cases and dissented
134
in the two others, and his dissent in one decision prompted a
135
colleague to request more time to review the papers in the case.
Such per curiam opinions, decided without full briefing or oral
argument, often reflect a certain level of subject matter confidence
from the Justices, as they are rationalized primarily in terms of
correcting perceived lower court errors rather than addressing close
136
or complex legal questions. Since Blackmun retired in 1994, the
Justices have issued no per curiam opinions in tax law although they
have decided five workplace law statutory cases in summary fashion
137
over the same period. Some of the Justices likely deferred to Justice
133. There were 67 nonunanimous tax decisions out of the 117 cases (including five per
curiam decisions) during Justice Blackmun’s tenure. He authored 19 of those 67 nonunanimous
opinions, and he wrote dissents in 17 of the remaining 48, or 35.4 percent.
134. See Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 15, 1973) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 167) (asking Justice Blackmun to “[p]lease join me in
your per curiam” opinion in United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973)); Memorandum from
Harry Blackmun to the Conference (Dec. 18, 1980) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra
note 128, Box 334) (introducing his per curiam opinion for HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450
U.S. 1 (1981)); Memorandum from Harry Blackmun to the Conference (Oct. 2, 1987) (on file
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 504) (attaching his per curiam opinion for
Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3 (1987)); Fausner v. Comm’r, 413 U.S. 838, 839 (1973)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 123 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting in part).
135. Letter from John Paul Stevens to Antonin Scalia (May 12, 1987) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 484) (requesting more time to take into account Justice
Blackmun’s opinion in Asphalt Products).
136. See generally EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 349–51 (9th ed.
2007) (pinpointing and criticizing the purported justifications for per curiam opinions); Arthur
D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise of Discretionary
Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 825–33 (1983) (cataloguing trends in the Court’s per curiam
opinions throughout the 1970s). Although both Gressman and Heller are critical of this
summary decisionmaking process, the Court’s absence of plenary consideration does seem to
reflect a certain level of interest and assuredness. See, e.g., HCSC-Laundry, 450 U.S. at 5–8
(summarily reversing a circuit court tax ruling that conflicts with several other courts); Clark
County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001) (summarily reversing a circuit court
workplace law decision in conflict with the decisions of other circuits).
137. The five per curiam decisions addressing workplace law statutory issues are Whitman v.
Department of Transportation, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1195
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Blackmun simply because they were not interested in tax law—
something Blackmun recognized inside the Court as well as in public
138
statements. It is also quite likely, though, that Blackmun’s fellow
Justices lacked confidence in their own knowledge about tax law
concepts, and thus deferred to him more than they would in most
139
other statutory areas.
Given Blackmun’s extraordinary role as a majority author in tax
cases, we compare his approach to legislative history reliance with
that of his colleagues. Table 9 presents our findings, broken down
into three time periods: Blackmun’s sixteen terms on the Burger
Court, his eight terms on the Rehnquist Court, and the fourteen
terms since Blackmun left the Court.
During Blackmun’s time on the Court, his fellow Justices relied
heavily on legislative history to help explain their majority opinions—
140
indeed they did so slightly more often than Justice Blackmun did.
This substantial reliance persisted during the first eight years of the
Rehnquist Court, even as Justice Scalia was directing sharp criticism
at his colleagues for using legislative history at all, criticism that
seemed to have a substantial effect on patterns of legislative history

(2006); Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); Clark County
School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001); Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208
(1998).
138. See Memorandum from Harry Blackmun to the Conference (Dec. 18, 1980) (on file
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 334) (referring humorously to “the eager
appetite [I know] all of you have for tax cases” and introducing his per curiam opinion for
HCSC-Laundry); Stuart Taylor, Reading the Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1986, at B14 (“If one’s in the doghouse with the Chief, he gets the crud. He gets the tax cases
and the Indian cases, which I like, but I’ve had a lot of them.” (quoting Harry Blackmun, J.,
United States Supreme Court)).
139. See Erwin Griswold, Preface to BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DISSENT WITHOUT
OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES, at xii
(1975) (“[E]xcept for Justice Blackmun, it is hard to find a member of the present Court who
has a real ‘feel’ for tax law.”). See generally Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax
Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1998) (describing Justice Blackmun’s
background in taxation issues and his jurisprudence in different classes of tax cases); Karen
Nelson Moore, Justice Blackmun’s Contributions on the Court: The Commercial Speech and
State Taxation Examples, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 29, 43–49 (1985) (clarifying Justice Blackmun’s
role in harmonizing inconsistent decisions related to taxes affecting interstate and foreign
commerce). Tax law also is not an area in which law clerks can readily compensate for their
Justice’s own felt inadequacies. Law clerks are likely to have taken only a single basic tax course
in law school, and they tend to be less interested in tax than other public law subjects.
140. We do not attach special importance to this difference in reliance: the fact that other
Justices invoked legislative history so regularly while Justice Blackmun was on the Court is the
salient point. For a suggestion that Blackmun’s use of legislative history may have served as a
cue for his colleagues, see infra note 308 and accompanying text.
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141

reliance in workplace law. Although Scalia pointedly refused to join
some tax majorities that used legislative history during this eight-year
142
period, there was no appreciable decrease in the use of legislative
history while Blackmun remained on the Court. After Blackmun
departed, however, the Court’s willingness to invoke legislative
143
history in its tax majorities significantly declined.
Table 9: Comparing Justice Blackmun’s Reliance on Legislative
144
History in Tax Cases with the Reliance of Other Justices*
Blackmun
Others’ Percent
Percent Reliance
Reliance
Burger Years, 1970–86
60 (15 of 24)
69.4 (34 of 49)
Rehnquist Years, 1987–94
50 (5 of 10)
64.3 (18 of 28)
Without Blackmun, 1995–2008
—
34.4 (11 of 32)
*Per curiam opinions are omitted from this analysis.

This later development may to some extent be viewed as part of
the broader downturn in reliance on legislative history dating from
Scalia’s arrival in 1986. Yet the lack of a downturn in tax cases until
the late 1990s stands in marked contrast to the pattern in workplace
law, in which the other Justices’ reliance on legislative history
declined sharply in the early years of the Rehnquist Court even as

141. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 133 (reporting a substantial decline in
legislative history reliance after 1986 for both proemployee and proemployer decisions);
Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of
Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 384–95 (1999) (discussing the decline since
the 1980s). See generally John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33 (2006) (arguing that Justice Scalia has caused the Court to focus more on
the text of the statute than legislative purpose).
142. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371–73 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing the Brennan majority for invoking a Senate floor debate to discern legislative
intent); Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 728 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to join a
portion of Justice Stevens’s majority that relies on House and Senate committee reports).
Justice Scalia has continued this criticism since Justice Blackmun’s retirement. See United
States. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 215 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (declining to join a portion of Justice Souter’s majority opinion); Chickasaw Nation
v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 86 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to join a portion of
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion).
143. The difference between the early Rehnquist years and the post-Blackmun period is
highly significant (t = .002). The decline did not begin in the initial years after Justice
Blackmun’s retirement, but by the late 1990s the Justices were relying substantially less on
legislative history than they had during Blackmun’s tenure. Copies of year-by-year results
during the 1990s are available from the authors.
144. We omitted the 1969–70 term from Table 9 because it precedes Justice Blackmun’s
arrival on the Court. Blackmun was confirmed by the Senate in May 1970.

BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC

2009]

5/5/2009 4:02:09 PM

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1275

145

Justice Blackmun’s reliance held steady. We suggest in Part III that
the delayed decrease in legislative history use for tax cases occurred
only when Justice Blackmun—the Court’s reigning expert in this
arcane field—retired. The remaining Justices had less of an appetite
for the technical and specialized discussions of tax law concepts
contained in committee reports.
One of our findings with respect to the Court’s use of substantive
canons appears consistent with the idea that other Justices may have
been “reluctant specialists” when confronting tax law issues. We
noted in Section C that the Justices relied on tax-specific substantive
canons in eleven of their twenty-four majorities using substantive
146
canons. It turns out that Justice Blackmun authored only one
147
majority decision invoking such a tax-specific canon while his
colleagues wrote ten. It is quite possible that Blackmun’s knowledge
of tax law left him more comfortable using content-specific resources
such as legislative history and past Supreme Court tax decisions,
whereas his colleagues who understood tax law less clearly (and also
had less substantive interest) were prepared to borrow more heavily
148
from tax-based policy presumptions.
III. EXPLORING SUPREME COURT REASONING IN TAX CASES
Our discussion examines three principal areas of difference,
identified in our results, between the Court’s approach to tax law and
workplace law. Our prior articles on the Justices’ reasoning in

145. We compared legislative history reliance by Blackmun in workplace law majorities with
reliance by all other Justices, using the same three time periods set forth in Table 9:
Table 9A: Comparing Justice Blackmun’s Reliance on Legislative History in Workplace
Cases with Reliance of Other Justices*
Blackmun Percent
Others’ Percent Reliance
Reliance
Burger Years, 1970–86
50 (12 of 24)
53.6 (136 of 253)
Rehnquist Years, 1987–94
50 (9 of 18)
33.3 (42 of 126)
Without Blackmun, 1995–2008
—
27.6 (40 of 145)
*Per curiam opinions are omitted from this analysis.
146. See supra Table 7: Mean Percent Reliance on Substantive Canon Subsets When
Substantive Canons Are Present, 1969–2008.
147. See Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 401 (1984).
148. Justice Blackmun’s reliance on Supreme Court precedent tends to support this
hypothesis: he relied on prior decisions in 91.2 percent of his majority opinions (31 of 34),
compared to 80.1 percent reliance (96 of 119) by all of the other Justices.
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workplace law serve as a baseline : we devote primary attention here
to pursuing how the Court’s reasoning in tax cases diverges from this
baseline. We first address variations in the Court’s approach to
legislative history because we believe this reflects the Justices’
appreciation for the distinctive ways in which Congress produces tax
legislative history. We then discuss more briefly the Court’s
differential approaches to the canons of construction: although less
dramatic than the legislative history story, we suggest that these too
reflect an understanding of certain distinctive elements in tax law.
Finally, we consider the impact of Justice Blackmun’s prominent role
in tax law cases and how deference to a single Justice in a subject
matter area may affect the Court’s reasoning approach in that area.
A. Legislative History
Our results provide ample evidence that the Court’s use of
legislative history varies markedly between tax and workplace law.
Table 2 indicates that in both the Burger era and the
Rehnquist/Roberts years the Court has relied on legislative history
150
more often to help justify tax decisions than workplace decisions.
Table 4 establishes that when the Court relies on legislative history, it
is significantly more likely to invoke standing committee reports in
tax cases than in workplace cases but far more inclined to rely on
conference committee reports and floor debates in its workplace
decisions. And Table 5 establishes that for majority opinions invoking
legislative history in nonunanimous cases, the dissent is significantly
more likely to disagree about the meaning of that history in
workplace decisions than in tax cases. We believe these results—
especially from Tables 4 and 5—reveal that the Justices value
legislative history in the tax setting for distinctive reasons, quite apart
from courts’ ordinary reliance on that history to help unpack the
legislative bargain captured in text.
1. Discerning Deals Versus Borrowing Expertise.

As many

149. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 62; Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 18.
150. The Court’s use of legislative history in tax cases declined sharply starting in the 2001
term and continuing precipitously over the next six terms (2002–07). See supra note 93 and
accompanying text and graph. Comparative data for the 2001–07 terms are available from the
authors. The significant difference in reliance that persisted through most of the Rehnquist
years has disappeared. We suggest why Justice Blackmun’s departure may be partly responsible
in Part III.C.
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scholars have observed, the inherent inefficiencies of Congress’s
lawmaking process mean that substantial adjustment and compromise
in the text of a bill following the bill’s introduction is the rule rather
151
than the exception. The legislative history that accompanies each
stage of the lawmaking process may shed light on the textual
modifications or compromises that occur during this process. Because
legislative deals are a well-recognized feature of congressional
lawmaking, courts traditionally regard legislative history as valuable
to help identify the existence of a negotiated compromise or to
152
explain specific aspects of a bargain.
The Court’s workplace law decisions invoking legislative history
regularly rely on this history to help discern or describe the deal. As
we have previously demonstrated, the Justices emphasize legislative
record evidence of explicit bargains reached during a bill’s
postintroduction journey through Congress to indicate when and why
specific employee rights or protections were traded away or
153
secured. Further, legislative history often describes or elaborates on
certain compromises reached at the preintroduction stage (such as
employer defenses or exceptions) that were agreed to among
154
interested parties.
We do not mean to suggest that the Court’s tax law
jurisprudence never involves the interpretation of legislative bargains,
especially bargains negotiated by members of Congress after a bill is
introduced. In their tax law opinions, the Justices have on occasion
used legislative history to help identify the point at which a
compromise was reached and the specifics of that compromise. In

151. See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 353–59
(16th ed. 1995); ALAN GRANT, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 45–52, 65–66, 302 (5th ed.
1994); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 84–86 (2d ed.
1995). For a discussion of the contrast with parliamentary efficiency in lawmaking and its
implications for how courts use legislative history, see Brudney, supra note 63, at 43–48.
152. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 32, at 596; Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 61, at
1422. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877–79 (1975) (discussing the judiciary’s role in
interpreting statutes to fulfill or further the original negotiated legislative deal).
153. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 150–51 & nn.113–16 (discussing the use of
legislative history to identify compromises and citing seven Court decisions as examples); see
also, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622–23 (2004); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,
250–63 (1994); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 820–23 (1980).
154. See, e.g., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 570–74 (1999); Am. Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 72–75 (1982); Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., 416 U.S. 653, 659–62
(1974); see also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 149 nn.93–98 (citing six additional
decisions).
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155

HCSC-Laundry v. United States, the issue was whether a nonprofit
corporation providing laundry and linen supply services to public
hospitals qualified for an income tax exemption under section 501 of
156
the Internal Revenue Code. The Court found “conclusive support”
for a negative answer in the legislative history, which revealed that
the Senate’s effort to cover hospital-related laundry services in the
text of section 501(e) was rebuffed by the House in conference, and
that a Senate amendment proposed eight years later to add laundry
157
services was defeated on the Senate floor. Similarly, in Bob Jones
158
University v. United States, the Court invoked committee report
commentary and Congress’s failure to act on proposed amendments
to support its decision that racially discriminatory private schools did
159
not qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3). And in
160
Commissioner v. Engle, the Court—rejecting the IRS position—
relied heavily on floor debates and conference committee narrative to
justify its decision allowing taxpayers to take percentage-depletion
161
deductions on revenues from their oil and gas leases.
Notwithstanding these examples, however, a far larger number
of Court decisions construing the statutory meaning of substantive tax
162
provisions rely on legislative history primarily for a different reason.
155. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981).
156. Id. at 3–5.
157. Id. at 6–7.
158. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
159. See id. at 600–01.
160. Comm’r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984).
161. Id. at 217–22; see also United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275–81 (1978) (relying on
Bankruptcy Act legislative history to establish that Congress meant to respond to the Treasury
Department’s stated concerns by providing that a bankrupt company’s withholding taxes,
collected from its employees but not paid over to the IRS, were nondischargeable).
162. We distinguish here between substantive and procedural aspects of the Internal
Revenue Code. Certain sections of the code, such as subchapter C dealing with corporations,
may present especially challenging or complex substantive questions. See infra Part III.A.3
(discussing United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970); Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989)).
By contrast, tax decisions that arise from procedural disputes tend to present issues with which
the Justices are more familiar and about which they have more confidence—in these instances
the Court’s reliance on legislative history is less likely to involve expertise-borrowing
considerations. See, e.g., United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) (relying on
legislative history to support the text-based conclusion that the equitable tolling doctrine does
not apply to the limitations period for filing tax-refund claims); Bufferd v. Comm’r, 506 U.S.
523, 530 n.10 (1993) (relying on legislative history to confirm that the three-year period for
assessing shareholder tax liability runs from the filing date of a shareholder’s individual return,
not the date of a corporation’s return); United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713,
730 & n.14 (1985) (relying on legislative history to help justify enforcement of an IRS levy
against a taxpayer bank); United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 310 & n.13 (1978)
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The Justices in these cases use commentary and elaboration from
standing committee reports as a form of expertise borrowing to help
them understand and apply the often arcane and complex concepts
163
Expertisecontained in Internal Revenue Code legislation.
borrowing majority opinions sometimes invoke committee report
explanations to confirm or reinforce the apparent plain meaning of
164
the text at issue. On other occasions, these majority opinions use
committee report analyses and discussions to resolve disputes in
which the Court acknowledges that the text at issue is ambiguous or
165
indefinite. Whether the legislative record materials are used to
resolve inconclusive language or to reinforce apparent meaning, the
congressional commentary on which these opinions rely is less
partisan or ideologically colored than much of the legislative history
invoked in workplace law decisions. Before discussing some
illustrative expertise-borrowing opinions, we explain why this more
neutral and objective legislative history reflects the distinctiveness of
the tax legislative process, especially the unique role played by the
Joint Committee on Taxation.

(relying on legislative history to help justify enforcement of an IRS summons to obtain evidence
for use in a criminal prosecution).
We also omit from consideration in this context Court decisions that rely on legislative
history to help resolve a nonprocedural constitutional dispute. See, e.g., United States v. Int’l
Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859–60 (1996) (relying on the legislative history of the Export
Clause to help support a conclusion invalidating a federal excise tax on premiums for insurance
purchased by the taxpayer’s foreign subsidiaries); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–59
(1982) (invoking legislative history to help support a conclusion that statutes requiring an
Amish employer to pay social security taxes do not violate the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 450–51 (1978) (using legislative history to
help support a conclusion that a federal tax on state-owned aircraft used for patrolling highways
does not violate the implied immunity of a state from federal taxation).
163. The Court, of course, deals with complex disputes on a regular basis. The complexity
that encourages reliance on expertise tends to involve issues of an unusually technical nature,
issues that judges view themselves as less capable of managing without input from specialists.
See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 165 & n.54 (1973);
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1 (1994).
164. See, e.g., Portland Golf Club v. Comm’r, 497 U.S. 154, 161–63, 165–66 (1990); Comm’r
v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 83–84, 90–93 (1977); Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm’r, 429 U.S. 569,
575–76, 580–82 (1977); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32, 42–46 (1976). For a
discussion of the Williams and Foster Lumber decisions, see infra Part III.A.3.
165. See, e.g., Clark, 489 U.S. at 741–43; Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 378
n.10, 393–94, 399 & n.55 (1983); Fed. Power Comm’n. v. Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div., 411
U.S. 458, 461–62, 467–70, 471–73 (1973); Davis, 397 U.S. at 308–12. For a discussion of the Clark
and Davis decisions, see infra Part III.A.3.
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2. The Joint Committee on Taxation and the Production of
166
Nonpartisan Expertise. Established under the Revenue Act of 1926,
the JCT consists of ten members of Congress: five members of the
Senate Finance Committee and five members of the House Ways and
Means Committee. JCT staff—including some forty economists,
lawyers, and other tax professionals—are nonpartisan, serve both the
House and Senate, and are concerned exclusively with tax-related
167
issues. The JCT staff from early on have been integrally involved at
168
every stage of the tax legislation process.
Most important for our purposes, the JCT staff are principally
responsible for preparing committee reports, soliciting input from
House and Senate committee staff, the Treasury Department, and the

166. Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 1203, 44 Stat. 9, 127–28 (1926) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 8022–23 (2006)).
167. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 3–4 (discussing the Committee staff’s
role as nonpartisan, joint, and solely tax oriented). Our review of Congressional Directories
going back to the 74th Congress indicates the JCT had five professional staff in 1936; that
number grew to twelve in 1953 (83d Congress), twenty in 1973 (93d Congress), thirty-four in
1983 (98th Congress), and thirty-eight in 2003 (108th Congress). Copies of relevant pages from
Congressional Directories are on file with the Duke Law Journal.
168. At the predrafting stage, JCT staff work closely with Treasury Department officials as
well as members of Congress to refine their revenue-related concepts into workable proposals.
Both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee often hold
hearings on these emerging tax legislative proposals. JCT staff prepare a hearing pamphlet
examining and analyzing the concepts to be addressed; they also may brief House and Senate
committee members and answer questions raised by members and their staffs during the
hearings. Until recently, markup in the House and Senate committees was based on these
concepts and proposals instead of on the actual statutory language that is the focus of
committee markups and votes for virtually every other law Congress produces. See, e.g., id. at 5–
6, 16; Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 809–12; Livingston, supra note 55, at 833–34; Manley,
supra note 55, at 1050–65; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 23–32.
Since the mid 1990s, there has been a shift toward having statutory language available at
markup, especially in the House. See Lecture, The Role of Tax Policy in the Development of Tax
Legislation: Larry Woodworth’s Era and Now, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006). For a
discussion of the more traditional committee markup in which committee members examine,
bargain over, and vote on the actual text of the bill, see CONG. QUARTERLY PRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 482–84 (5th ed. 2000); WALTER J.
OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 98–105 (7th ed. 2007).
JCT staff also work with minority committee members and their staffs, upon request, to prepare
markup alternatives. See Kenneth F. Thomas & William R. Stromsem, The Joint Committee on
Taxation, TAX ADVISOR, Mar. 1980, at 181, 182 (discussing how the JCT staff advised members
on opposite sides during floor debate). During or after the markup, JCT staff are part of an ad
hoc team of experts drafting the text of the approved bill; they work with staff from the House
and Senate committees, tax specialists in the House and Senate legislative counsel’s office, and
the Treasury Department, with IRS staff at times providing technical advice.

BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC

2009]

5/5/2009 4:02:09 PM

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1281

169

IRS. These reports typically include detailed narrative explanations
of the technical bill language, specific illustrations of how the bill is to
apply in certain settings, and more general discussion of the problems
with present law that the bill is meant to address and the ways in
170
which the committee’s proposed solution will address them. The
committee reports along with the text are thus collaborative staff
efforts to translate and amplify the conceptual and policy decisions
171
reached by House and Senate committees.
Tax law policies tend to be very complex, involving arcane
terminology and highly technical concepts. The key participants in tax
legislation recognize that the text alone cannot fully explicate these
172
concepts. Indeed the technical, self-referential, and often obscure
nature of Internal Revenue Code language means that explanatory
materials are particularly important in an area likely to affect so much
173
of the public. It is therefore not surprising that members voting on
the House and Senate floor rely especially heavily on committee

169. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 6; Livingston, supra note 55, at 835;
Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 811–12. The JCT staff drafted only the more general
explanatory portions of the committee reports in the 1960s; the technical explanations were
initially written by the IRS and then reviewed and modified by JCT staff and others. See
Woodworth, supra note 55, at 28.
170. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 28; see also
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 passim (1954); S. REP. NO. 99-313 passim (1986).
171. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Livingston, supra note 55, at 835; Moran &
Schneider, supra note 55, at 892. JCT staff also play a central role during floor debates and in
conference committee. Indeed, they are primarily responsible for incorporating relevant
contributions into the statement of managers that is part of the conference agreement. See Joint
Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 6–7; Livingston, supra note 55, at 835–36; Ferguson et al.,
supra note 55, at 810; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 28–29.
172. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 28–29; Joint
Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 6.
173. See Livingston, supra note 55, at 841; Moran & Schneider, supra note 55, at 892
(contending that in light of tax language opacity, “a paragraph in a committee report can often
illuminate a bit of aspiration that a sub-sub-subsection can only hint at”). In addition to
committee reports, the JCT staff also prepares a postenactment legislative history document,
commonly known as the Blue Book, in connection with major tax bills. Although it is principally
a collation of the various preenactment committee reports, the Blue Book does include
explanatory materials written following enactment. In spite of traditional concerns regarding the
validity and value of postenactment legislative history, the Blue Book has been invoked on
numerous occasions by lower courts and at least once by the Supreme Court. See Michael
Livingston, What’s Blue and White and Not Quite as Good as a Committee Report: General
Explanations and the Role of “Subsequent” Tax Legislative History, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 91, 98–
122 (1994).
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report explanations and elaborations to help them understand the
174
technical bill language.
The value of this history, for both members and the Treasury
Department, is enhanced because the committee reports are
175
produced in such an unusually bipartisan and objective manner.
One clear indicator of the bipartisan nature of tax committee reports
is the remarkable dearth of substantive minority views. Reports on
major tax legislation often feature hundreds of pages of explanatory
176
material with virtually no minority submission at all. By contrast,
major workplace statutes enacted across the same decades (the 1940s
through the 1990s) are replete with in-depth discussion and argument
177
by members of the committee minority. Finally, tax committee
reports perform a miniregulation function when, as often happens,
the Treasury Department takes years to issue formal regulations on
178
particular topics.
Admittedly, Congress’s overall lawmaking process has become
increasingly partisan in recent times. This is particularly true in the
House, in which the leadership after 1995 became more active in
shaping legislation, standing committee roles were consequently
somewhat diminished, and cooperation ebbed between the two

174. See Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at 810; Livingston, supra note 55, at 836. Tax
committee reports typically include detailed, in-depth amplifications of what is contained in
text. For examples, see infra note 176. This information is more comprehensive and often more
comprehensible than what is found in floor debates or conference reports involving tax bills.
175. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 3–4; Ferguson et al., supra note 55, at
807; Woodworth, supra note 55, at 24–25; Manley, supra note 55, at 1050–52.
176. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333 (1942) (187-page report accompanying the Revenue
Act of 1942 with one member contributing a one-page dissent); S. REP. NO. 83-1622 (1954) (628page report accompanying the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 with no minority views); H.R.
REP. NO. 99-426 (1985) (1072-page report accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1986 with
eleven members signing minority views totaling three pages); S. REP. NO. 105-33 (1997) (376page report accompanying the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 with no minority views).
177. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 80-245 (1947) (115-page report accompanying the Taft-Hartley
Act with six members contributing 51 pages of minority views); H.R. REP. NO. 88-114 (1964)
(133-page report accompanying the 1964 Civil Rights Act with eight members contributing 52
pages of minority views); S. REP. NO. 100-62 (1987) (95-page report accompanying the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act with five Senators signing 15 pages of minority
views); S. REP. NO. 101-263 (1990) (73-page report accompanying the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act with five Senators contributing 21 pages of minority views). Whether the tax
lawmaking process has become more partisan since 2000 is an open question. See H.R. REP. NO.
107-7 (2001) (31-page report accompanying the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001
with 17 members—every Democrat on the committee—signing the five-page dissenting views);
see also supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
178. See Livingston, supra note 55, at 841.
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179

chambers. These larger changes have not coincided with the
development of a major tax reform measure such as the 1954 or 1986
laws, but they may have made it harder for the JCT to perform its
180
nonpartisan functions with respect to regular tax bills. Whether
these trends will continue or the House will revert to a more
traditional committee-dominated legislative approach is not yet clear.
Still, the distinctive aspects of the tax lawmaking process
181
described here remain substantially in place. Accordingly, the
nature of tax legislation continues to make committee reports
especially useful to members of Congress and other key participants
in the lawmaking enterprise. As we now illustrate, the Supreme
Court’s reliance on those reports reflects at least implicitly an
appreciation for their special qualities.
3. Illustrative Expertise-Borrowing Opinions. There are some
direct indications that the Justices understand the special nature of
tax legislative history and its relationship to their own ability to
master the enigmas and intricacies of the Internal Revenue Code.
Justice Douglas, hardly one to shrink from construing technical
statutory schemes, complained with some frequency that the Court
does not hear enough tax cases to develop the needed level of
expertise, and that the better route for resolving ambiguities in the
tax code or its regulations would be to present the dispute to the Joint
182
Committee on Taxation. There also have been a number of
instances in which the Court majority relied on a JCT report or
analysis (apart from the House and Senate committee reports drafted
179. See generally John H. Aldrich & David W. Rhode, Congressional Committees in a
Partisan Era, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 249, 254–65 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005); Eric Schickler & Kathryn Pearson, The House Leadership in
an Era of Partisan Warfare, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra, at 207, 208; George K. Yin,
Lecture, Is the Tax System Beyond Reform?, 58 FLA. L. REV. 977, 1020–23 (2006).
180. Cf. Yin, supra note 179, at 1029–38 (discussing challenges posed by these larger trends
with respect to undertaking major tax reform in the future). Another influence on the substance
and politics of tax legislation—changes in congressional budget procedures—is beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of
Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998).
181. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 55, at 1, 5–8; Lecture, supra note 168, at 6–7,
12.
182. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 114–15 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting); see also Bernard
Wolfman et al., The Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235,
320–25 (1973) (analyzing Justice Douglas’s evolution on tax cases to a point of mistrust of
special interest favoritism of the Internal Revenue Code and viewing his contention that the
Court should avoid tax cases altogether in light of this deep mistrust).
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by JCT staff) to help understand what Congress truly meant to
183
accomplish—by curatively limiting a tax deduction provision,
184
designing a particular windfall-profits tax scheme, or restricting
185
utilities to certain depreciation methods.
For the most part,
however, the Court’s reliance on legislative history to borrow
expertise occurs through its use of House and Senate committee
reports. One example in which the Court invoked this legislative
186
history to give meaning to inconclusive text is United States v. Davis;
the Court had to determine whether a shareholder’s redemption of
stock in his own closely held corporation was taxable as ordinary
187
income or capital gains.
The taxpayer in Davis received $25,000 when the company
redeemed the one thousand shares of preferred stock he had
188
previously purchased for $25 per share. He claimed that the
purchase and redemption were undertaken for a valid business
purpose and thus qualified as an exchange with no gain recognized.
The IRS contended that the distribution constituted payment of
189
dividends taxable as ordinary income. A corporation’s redemption
of its stock is often taxed as a dividend, but section 302(b)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code treats redemptions “not essentially
190
equivalent to a dividend” as exchanges.
Most courts of appeals had determined that a redemption was
“not essentially equivalent to a dividend” if it was the final step in a
course of conduct that had a business motivation rather than a tax191
avoidance purpose, but the Supreme Court held otherwise. Relying
on House and Senate committee reports, Justice Marshall for the
Court explained how the 1954 code’s predecessor language had
developed in response to concerns that closely held corporations
might avoid taxation by making certain kinds of distributions to their

183.
184.
185.
(1973).
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1994).
See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85–86 n.15 (1983).
See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. 411 U.S. 458, 471–72
United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
Id. at 303–04.
Id. at 302–03.
Id.
Id. at 303–04 (discussing language of 26 U.S.C. § 302(b)(1) (1954)).
See id. at 303 n.2.
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192

stockholders. Faced with widespread confusion generated by lower
court interpretations of that earlier text, the authors of the 1954 Code
sought to facilitate tax planning by providing “objective tests to
193
govern the tax consequences of stock redemptions.”
Justice Marshall then explained how the “essentially equivalent”
language had been added by the Senate Finance Committee as a
means of narrowing the circumstances in which corporate
194
redemptions would receive capital gains treatment. The Court
quoted at length from the Senate report providing a “detailed
195
technical evaluation of § 302(b)(1).” The Court’s excerpts from the
report explained that
in applying this test for the future . . . the inquiry will be devoted
solely to . . . whether or not the transaction by its nature may
properly be characterized as a sale of stock by the redeeming
shareholder to the corporation. For this purpose the presence or
196
absence of earnings and profits of the corporation is not material.

The Court inferred from this legislative history discussion that “by
making the sole inquiry relevant for the future the narrow one
whether the redemption could be characterized as a sale, Congress
was apparently rejecting past court decisions that had also considered
factors indicating the presence or absence of a tax-avoidance
197
motive.”
Justice Marshall also drew on Senate and House
committee analyses of tax consequences associated with other types
of corporate transactions to confirm that business purpose factors
were not meant to be relevant under the “essentially equivalent”
198
language of section 302(b)(1). The Court in Davis thus relied
heavily on detailed technical explanations contained in the tax
committees’ reports to overturn a fairly widespread precedent in the
199
lower courts.
192. See id. at 308–09 (quoting from a House committee report accompanying the 1926
Revenue Act).
193. Id. at 309–10 (discussing a House committee report accompanying the 1954 code
revision).
194. Id. at 310.
195. Id. at 311.
196. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 234 (1954)).
197. Id. at 311–12.
198. See id. at 311 n.11 (discussing the committee’s treatment of distributions involving
partial corporate liquidations).
199. Justice Douglas, in a short dissent for himself and two other Justices, relied only on the
text and made no reference to the legislative history. See id. at 313 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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A second, somewhat related, example of borrowing expertise
from standing committee reports to resolve textual ambiguity is
200
Commissioner v. Clark. The taxpayer in Clark—the president and
sole shareholder of a business—agreed to merge his company into the
201
wholly owned subsidiary of a publicly traded corporation. Under
the terms of the merger, Clark was offered the choice of a large
volume of common stock or a somewhat smaller volume of shares
combined with a cash payment or “boot” of more than three million
202
dollars. He took the latter offer: the issue was whether the boot was
taxable as a long-term capital gain under the general rule of section
356(a)(1) of the tax code or—as the IRS contended—taxable as
ordinary income because the exchange had “the effect of the
distribution of a dividend” under the exception provided in section
203
356(a)(2).
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, distinguished at the
outset the Court’s earlier holding in Davis because this case involved
204
an exchange pursuant to a merger of two corporations. Accordingly,
the relevant code section was not 302(b)(1) but 356(a), covering
exchanges pursuant to a corporate reorganization accompanied by
205
additional consideration referred to as “boot.” Justice Stevens
noted that the circuits were split on the rules for determining whether
such exchanges had “the effect of the distribution of a dividend” and
206
that the text itself was “admittedly ambiguous.”
After invoking Congress’s purpose generally to treat boot in
reorganizations as capital gain and the general judicial preference to
207
avoid an “expansive reading of a somewhat ambiguous exception,”
Justice Stevens turned to the legislative history. The House and
Senate committee reports accompanying the Revenue Act of 1924
elaborated on provisions later carried forward in substantially
200. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989).
201. Id. at 731.
202. Id. “The term ‘boot’ is used because shareholders of the transferor corporation have
received stock or securities of the acquiring corporation plus money (or other property) to
boot.” See Allan J. Samansky, Taxation of Nonqualifying Property Distributed in
Reorganizations, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1980–81).
203. Clark, 489 U.S. at 731–32.
204. Id. at 728–29, 732 (finding that the merger qualified as a “reorganization” under 26
U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1954)).
205. Id. at 736–38; see also supra note 202.
206. Clark, 489 U.S. at 736–37, 741. For a thoughtful treatment of this issue prior to Clark,
see Samansky, supra note 202, at 15–38.
207. Clark, 489 U.S. at 739.
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208

identical form as section 356(a)(2). Justice Stevens inferred from
this legislative history that Congress’s primary concern was to
“prevent[] corporations from ‘siphon[ing] off’ accumulated earnings
and profits at a capital gains rate through the ruse of a
209
reorganization.” He then quoted at length from the one example
relied on in both committee reports to illustrate what they meant
210
when seeking to “prevent evasion.” Unlike the arm’s-length stockfor-stock transaction at issue here, the committee report example set
forth a situation involving “merely the creation of a wholly owned
subsidiary as a mechanism for making a cash distribution to the
211
shareholders.”
Importantly, Justice Stevens found it persuasive that in the
committee’s most extensive consideration of the disputed text, there
was no indication that bona fide exchanges between unrelated parties
as part of a reorganization should be classified under the “avoiding
212
tax evasion” purposes of section 356(a)(2). Indeed, although he
recognized that the “has the effect . . . of a dividend” language of
section 356 was “certainly similar” to the “essentially equivalent to a
dividend” language of section 302, Justice Stevens noted that the
Senate committee’s discussion of section 302(b)(1) focused on
bypassing considerations of taxpayer motive whereas the committee
213
reports here stressed the centrality of a motive standard. As in
Davis, the Court in Clark invoked detailed committee report
explanations to help explain ambiguous text in an area of technical
214
complexity.
215
In a third instance, Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, the
Court borrowed expertise from legislative history to reinforce its
reliance on text and other resources. The question presented was
whether a company that contributed a promissory note to its
208. See id. at 742–43.
209. Id. at 742.
210. Id. at 742–43.
211. Id. at 742.
212. Id. at 743.
213. Id. at 743–44.
214. In a dissenting opinion, Justice White contended that the Court’s decision in Davis was
controlling; he relied on the similarity in textual language and asserted that Congress in 1924—
as in 1954—intended the broadest possible reach for its tax treatment of corporate
reorganization transactions. See id. at 747–48 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined the
majority in its discussion of purpose, text, and canons, but not in its extensive reliance on
legislative history. Id. at 728 n.* (majority opinion).
215. Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm’r, 429 U.S. 569 (1977).
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employee profit-sharing plan “paid” the amount and therefore could
deduct it in the earlier year under section 404(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code, although the check satisfying the liability was not
216
issued until the following year. The Court, supporting the IRS, held
that the deduction was only allowed for the year the amount was
217
paid, even for taxpayers using an accrual method of accounting.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, relied initially on the
text of section 404(a) and its relation to other sections of the code. He
recognized that the tax code allows for both cash and accrual methods
of accounting and that many of the code’s deduction provisions use
218
the words “paid or accrued” or “paid or incurred.” He noted,
219
though, that section 404’s simple use of “contributions . . . paid”
under a profit-sharing plan “stands in obvious contrast” to those
numerous other provisions, and he reasoned that Congress meant to
allow deductions for profit-sharing plan contributions only when
actually paid rather than when accrued or incurred on a taxpayer’s
220
books.
Justice Blackmun next reviewed the legislative history, which he
221
found to be “consistent with the theme of the statute’s language.”
He invoked the House and Senate committee reports accompanying
section 404’s substantially identical predecessor text from 1939 and
1942; these reports discussed how an accrual-basis taxpayer’s deferred
compensation to its employees was initially to be deductible in the
222
year that “compensation is paid.” Blackmun turned to Senate
hearing testimony from 1942 and committee report discussions from
1948 and 1954 to explain that Congress responded to concerns about
computational problems associated with this compensation-based
approach by first creating and then extending a grace period for filing
returns that allowed for the deduction of plan contributions when
223
they were actually paid.

216. Id. at 571–72.
217. Id. at 574–83.
218. Id. at 574.
219. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 404(a) (1954)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 575.
222. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 106 (1942)); S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 141 (1942)).
223. Id. at 575–76. Blackmun also relied on the conference report accompanying changes to
the 1974 tax code that were part of ERISA to show that Congress in 1974 “reaffirmed the
actual-payment requirement of § 404(a), and strengthened its enforceability.” Id. at 580 n.11
(relying on H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 308 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)).
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Finally, the majority used legislative history to refute the
reasoning of the three circuits that had ruled against the IRS. The
appellate courts had assumed that the word “paid” must encompass
delivery of a promissory note because that same term in a different
section of the tax code had been so applied. But Justice Blackmun
pointed to the House and Senate committee report discussions
accompanying that separate section to help explain why the policy
concerns there were not analogous to those at stake under section
224
404(a).
The majority in Don E. Williams Co. did not quote as extensively
from committee report language as the Court did in Davis and Clark.
Rather, Justice Blackmun used committee report excerpts from four
different Congresses to establish a narrative that reinforced and
elaborated on the majority’s formal textual analysis. In our final
225
example, United States v. Foster Lumber Co., the Court also
referenced committee reports in more summary terms to reinforce
the apparent plain meaning of text.
In Foster Lumber, the taxpayer experienced a net operating loss
of $42,000 and sought to carry over the loss as a deduction to offset
taxable income from prior years, pursuant to section 172 of the
226
code. The issue was whether the loss carryover was absorbed only
by the ordinary income earned in a prior year, as the taxpayer argued,
or was also absorbed by capital gains in that prior year, the IRS
227
position. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated that the
“dispute . . . center[ed] on the meaning of ‘taxable income’ as used in
228
§172(b)(2).” He then relied on code definitions of “gross income” as
well as structural canon arguments, reasoning that taxable income is
gross income minus allowable deductions and that gross income is “all
income from whatever source derived,” including capital gains as
229
“[g]ains derived from dealings in property.”
224. Id. at 580–82. Justice Stewart, dissenting for himself and Justice Powell, relied on lower
court decisions that he contended had properly construed the word “paid” to allow deductions
for promissory notes; he found the majority’s use of legislative history unpersuasive. See id. at
583–88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
225. United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976).
226. Id. at 33–36.
227. Id. The taxpayer had $7,000 in ordinary income and argued that it therefore should
have $35,000 of the $42,000 loss carryover available to offset income the following year. Id. at
35–36. The IRS contended that because the taxpayer had capital gains of $167,000, the entire
loss carryover was absorbed in the first tax year.
228. Id. at 36.
229. Id. at 36–37 (alteration in original) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1964)).
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As in Don E. Williams, the majority in Foster Lumber turned to
legislative history for confirmation—“to consider, in short, whether
the construction sought is in harmony with the statute as an organic
230
whole.” Invoking an earlier Supreme Court opinion, the taxpayer
argued that Congress’s sole purpose in allowing loss carryovers was to
reduce the unduly harsh impact of taxing income strictly on a system
231
of annual accounting. Justice Stewart responded that in deciding to
allow income averaging, Congress was not seeking simply to eliminate
arbitrary consequences but was pursuing other policy objectives as
232
well. He cited a JCT report to explain that Congress also had in
mind allowing shareholders in companies with fluctuating incomes to
regularize their own tax treatment so that they did not in effect have
to pay a tax on capital when compared to the owners of businesses
233
with a more stable year-to-year income. And he relied on a House
Report to maintain that loss carryovers were allowed in part “to
stimulate enterprise and investment, particularly in new businesses or
risky ventures where early losses can be carried forward to more
234
prosperous years in the future.” Given these additional policy
considerations, Justice Stewart reasoned that Congress’s willingness
to provide for a more limited form of loss carryover comported with
235
the pursuit of multiple goals.
The four decisions discussed here illustrate how the Court has
used tax legislative history to elucidate the meaning of complex tax
code concepts. The Davis and Clark decisions involve issues that arise
out of subchapter C, dealing with corporations, in which one might
236
expect to find unusually challenging concepts. But the Court’s
expertise borrowing is not limited to this traditionally complex area,
as the Don E. Williams and Foster Lumber cases demonstrate.
Further, a number of Justices besides the four majority authors
identified here have relied on legislative history for expertise230. Id. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Id. at 42–43.
232. Id. at 42–44.
233. Id. at 42 & n.9.
234. Id. at 43 (paraphrasing H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 27 (1954); H.R. REP. NO. 76-855, at 9
(1939)).
235. See id. at 43–46. Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent for himself and three colleagues,
relied on different portions of the legislative history to support his view that Congress since 1939
had steadily expanded the periods for loss carryover to maximize taxpayers’ ability to absorb
their losses against income. See id. at 56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236. See Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 90 (1977).
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237

borrowing purposes. One Justice who has not done so, however, is
Justice Scalia, as we now explain.
4. What Justice Scalia Missed. Since joining the Court, Justice
Scalia has regularly criticized his colleagues for relying on legislative
238
history in their majority opinions. In a series of concurrences and
dissents, Scalia has contended that legislative history is very likely to
239
be generated for strategic or insincere reasons, that it is drafted or
240
understood by at best small subgroups of members, and that for
241
these and other systemic reasons it is fundamentally unreliable.
Justice Scalia has adopted this implacable stance in tax law cases
as well. Although he occasionally joins majority opinions that invoke
242
tax legislative history, he more often disparages such reliance even
when he agrees with the Court’s holding. He has criticized majority
243
use of legislative history in numerous separate concurrences and
237. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 479–85 (1990) (O’Connor, J., majority
opinion); Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 378, 393–94, 399 (1983) (O’Connor, J.,
majority opinion); United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26–28 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
majority opinion); Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 83–84, 90–93 (1977) (Brennan, J., majority
opinion); Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 255–57 (1981) (Powell, J., majority
opinion); United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 n.8, 453 n.14 (1973) (Powell, J., majority
opinion); O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 84–86 (1996) (Breyer, J., majority opinion). In
addition, Justice Blackmun—the Court’s principal authority on federal tax law—often invoked
legislative history to borrow expertise. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 315–16 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., majority opinion); Cent. Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673, 680–82,
689–91 (1974) (Blackmun, J., majority opinion); see also infra Part III.C (analyzing Blackmun’s
role in tax cases).
238. For a detailed summary of Scalia’s record on this score, see Brudney & Ditslear, supra
note 52, at 161–62. The article cites to twenty separate opinions from 1987 to 2006. Id.
239. See, e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279–80
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637–38 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267 (2004) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,
527–28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
241. See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1990–91 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 642–43 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
242. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 479–85 (1990); United States v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132, 139–42 (1989); Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
Comm’r, 491 U.S. 244, 259 (1989).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67–70 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
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also has refused to join the legislative history portions of majority
244
decisions. One of Scalia’s earliest and most-cited critiques of
legislative history involves an excerpt from the floor debate
accompanying a tax statute, an excerpt reproduced at some length by
then-Judge Scalia of the D.C. Circuit.
245
In Hirschey v. FERC, Judge Scalia, in a concurring opinion,
complained that deference to committee reports was “converting a
system of judicial construction into a system of committee-staff
246
prescription.” The concurrence included a footnote that reproduced
extended portions of a 1982 floor exchange between Senator
Armstrong, a first-term Republican Senator, and Senator Dole, who
247
was then chairman of the Finance Committee. The excerpts, which
Scalia described as an “illuminating exchange,” featured Armstrong
expressing concern that the committee report was not written or
voted on by senators and may not have been read by them in its
entirety, and suggesting that courts, agencies, and practicing attorneys
should look for congressional intent in the words of the statute and
248
not in such committee reports. It is worth noting, in passing, that
many more members of Congress since the 1980s have urged that
249
courts should pay attention to legislative history as a general matter.
the judgment); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 372–73 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
244. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 85–86 (2001); United States v.
Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 214–15 (1996); Comm’r v. Clark, 489
U.S. 726, 728 (1989).
245. Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
246. Id. at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 7 n.1. Senator Armstrong (R-Colo.) was a member of the Senate from 1979 to
1991, and a very junior Republican on the Finance Committee from 1981 to 1991. See 1
GARRISON NELSON, COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 1947–1992, at 139–44 (1993). Senator
Dole, elected in 1968, was a member of the Senate Finance Committee for twenty-four years
(from 1973 to 1996). See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774–
1996, at 951 (Joel D. Treese ed., 1997); 1 NELSON, supra, at 139–44. He served as chairman from
1981 to 1984, as ranking minority member from 1979 to 1980, and as second-ranking Republican
member from 1985 to 1986; he also served as Senate Majority Leader (from 1985 to 1986 and
from 1995 to 1996) and Senate Minority Leader (from 1987 to 1994). See BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774–1996, supra, at 951; 1 NELSON, supra, at 139–
44.
248. See Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 7 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring).
249. See, e.g., Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 170–74 (1994)
(statement of Sen. Charles F. Grassley, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); Nomination of
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 223–25 (1993) (statement of Sen.
William S. Cohen, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 325–26 (statement of Sen. Dennis
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Scalia later reproduced exactly the same excerpts—taken from
his concurrence in Hirschey—in his well-known book on how federal
250
courts should interpret the Constitution and laws. The ArmstrongDole colloquy is rather long and it is understandable that Scalia
251
would have edited it down for his own purposes. What interests us,
though is one particular explanation from Senator Dole that Scalia
omitted. We reproduce the omitted portion in italics, along with the
immediate context for the omission.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, will the Senator tell me whether or
not he wrote the committee report?
Mr. DOLE. Did I write the committee report?
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes.
Mr. DOLE. No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the committee
report.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did any Senator write the committee report?
Mr. DOLE. I have to check.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Does the Senator know of any Senator who wrote
the Committee report?
Mr. DOLE. I might be able to identify one, but I would have to
search. I was here all during the time it was written, I might say, and
worked carefully with the staff as they worked. As I recall, during the
July 4 recess week there were about five different working groups of
staff from both parties, the joint committee, and the Treasury working
252
on different provisions.

DeConcini, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of
Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 43, 45–48 (1988); Abner J. Mikva, A
Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 385–86; Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a
Narrow View in Seeking Congress’ Will, 48 CONG. Q. 913, 917 (1990) (relating Senator Specter’s
view). Members of both parties have continued to participate in negotiating and relying on
legislative history, further suggesting that complaints such as Senator Armstrong’s are isolated
voices.
250. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 32–34.
251. Judge Scalia’s concurrence in Hirschey does include additional excerpts from the DoleArmstrong colloquy apart from the excerpt reproduced in text. See Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 7 n.1
(Scalia, J., concurring).
252. 128 CONG. REC. 16,918 (1982) (emphasis added). There are other omissions from the
colloquy excerpts that Judge Scalia reproduced in the Hirschey footnote and his book. These
omissions suggest that Senator Armstrong was concerned that committee reports not be treated
by courts or agencies “as if they were something better than statutes” and that such an approach
would be especially dangerous in the area of tax law. Id. at 16,919 (statement of Sen.
Armstrong). Senator Dole did not argue that legislative history is superior to text, but he did
state that he “certainly hope[d]” the IRS and the courts would “take guidance as to the
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For Scalia, focused on what he regards as the systemic flaws of
legislative history, the particular aspects of tax legislative history were
not relevant. But for Senator Dole, who spent over a decade as one of
the key architects of federal tax legislation, the legislative history
drafting process was of considerable relevance. Dole was apparently
attempting to educate his freshman colleague about how this
legislative history was produced—in deliberative bipartisan fashion,
with interbranch cooperation and a prominent role for the Joint
Committee on Taxation.
253
As we described, this approach to the production of committee
reports has been an essential feature of the tax law-writing enterprise
for at least fifty years. Senator Dole, like other central players in the
tax legislation process, fully anticipated that the expert elaborations
contained in these reports would furnish valuable insights for courts
and agencies as to what Congress meant to accomplish when enacting
254
new tax code provisions. Most Supreme Court Justices serving since
1970 seem to have endorsed Dole’s position, even if subconsciously,
by relying on committee reports to borrow expertise when construing
the technical and complex concepts enacted into the tax code. By
insisting that legislative history be deemed inadmissible on an acrossthe-board basis, Justice Scalia has overlooked or disregarded the
special role played by tax legislative history in the production of tax
statutes.
B. The Canons of Construction
Our findings regarding subject matter variations in the way the
Court uses the canons are somewhat less dramatic than our results
with respect to legislative history. Initially, the Court invokes the two

intention of Congress from the committee report which accompanies this bill.” Id. at 16,918
(statement of Sen. Dole); see also infra note 254 (reproducing this exchange).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58, 169–78.
254. In another part of the exchange with Armstrong, also omitted from the footnote in
Hirschey, Senator Dole makes explicit his intent in this regard:
Mr. ARMSTRONG. My question, which may take him by surprise, is this: Is it the
intention of the chairman that the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court and
other courts take guidance as to the intention of Congress from the committee report
which accompanies this bill?
Mr. DOLE. I would certainly hope so, plus not only the committee report but
hopefully in the debate on certain compliance provisions that we will probably have
lengthy discussions on the next few days.
128 CONG. REC. 16,918.
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types of canons in a smaller number of majority opinions. Further,
regarding the categories we identified in Tables 6 and 7, the Justices
tend to rely on the same types of canons in both tax and workplace
decisions. For language canons, the Court in both subject matter
areas invokes structural integrity presumptions like the whole act rule
more often than linguistic presumptions about the meaning
256
attributable to particular words. Similarly for substantive canons,
the Justices rely more often on policy norms derived from generally
applicable legal principles (like avoiding constitutional questions or
repeals by implication) than on policy norms tailored to the particular
257
subject matter of tax or workplace law.
Still, we identified certain differences in canons usage that
warrant further examination. Table 7 establishes that the Justices rely
on tax-based substantive canons almost half the time they use
substantive canons—this is far more often than the Court invokes
substantive canons that are tailored to workplace law. We posit that
this is a form of subsidiary expertise borrowing by the Justices in the
tax law area. Table 6 indicates that the Court relies on structural
integrity language canons more heavily in tax than in workplace law.
We suggest that this reflects the Court’s understanding of tax statutes
as part of a single unified code. To illustrate our findings, we discuss
particular tax opinions in which the Court exhibits these two
canonical proclivities.
1. Borrowing Expertise from Tax-Based Substantive Canons. In
258
United States v. Wells Fargo Bank,
the Court held that

255. For both tax and workplace law decisions over the thirty-nine year period, the Court
relied on language canons about half as often as it invoked legislative history and relied on
substantive canons less than one-third as often as it used legislative record materials. Compare
Table 4: Mean Percent Reliance on Legislative History Sources When Legislative History is
Present, 1969–2008 (finding that the Court used legislative history in 88 tax decisions and 247
workplace decisions), with Table 6: Mean Percent Reliance on Language Canon Subsets When
Language Canons Are Present, 1969–2008 (finding that the Court relied on language canons in
47 tax cases and 123 workplace cases), and Table 7: Mean Percent Reliance on Substantive
Canon Subsets When Substantive Canons Are Present, 1969–2008 (finding that the Court
invoked substantive canons in 24 tax decisions and 73 workplace decisions).
256. For a showing of 91 percent reliance on structural integrity language canons in tax law
and 76 percent reliance in workplace law, see supra Table 6: Mean Percent Reliance on
Language Canon Subsets When Language Canons Are Present, 1969–2008.
257. For a showing of 93 percent reliance on generally applicable substantive canons in tax
law and 67 percent reliance in tax law, see supra Table 7: Mean Percent Reliance on Substantive
Canon Subsets When Substantive Canons Are Present, 1969–2008.
258. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351 (1988).

BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC

1296

5/5/2009 4:02:09 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1231

congressionally authorized “Project Notes,” issued by state and local
housing authorities to stimulate local financing of housing projects,
259
were not statutorily exempt from federal estate taxation. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, relied heavily on the substantive
canon that “exemptions from taxation are not to be implied; they
260
must be unambiguously proved.”
This canon provided the
framework for the Court’s opinion and is the key justification driving
the majority analysis. Referring to the estate executors’ various
arguments, Justice Brennan concluded that
the factors appellees rely upon, whether considered alone or in
combination, are insufficient to demonstrate that Congress intended
to exempt Project Notes from estate taxation in contravention of the
understood meaning of §5(e), a demonstration which must be
unambiguous under the principle disfavoring implied tax
261
exemptions.
262

More recently, in Commissioner v. Banks, the Court held that
the portion of taxpayers’ monetary settlement paid directly to their
attorneys under a contingent fee agreement constituted taxpayers’
263
gross income under the Internal Revenue Code. Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, relied heavily on the substantive canon that
264
“gains should be taxed to those who earned them.” Kennedy
referred to this canon as “a maxim we have called the first principle
265
of income taxation,” and as the rationale for the established
266
The Court
doctrine of anticipatory assignment of income.
considered taxpayer arguments that this maxim was limited to
preventing taxpayer fraud, but concluded that the maxim applied
267
more broadly and encompassed contingent fee agreements.
268
Finally, United States v. Arthur Young & Co. involves a taxspecific substantive canon covering IRS enforcement powers. The
259. Id. at 354–59.
260. Id. at 354.
261. Id. at 356 (emphasis added); see also id. at 359 (“The understood meaning of § 5(e) and
the presumption against implied tax exemptions are too powerful to be overcome by the indicia
of congressional intent put forward by appellees.”).
262. Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005).
263. Id. at 433–35.
264. Id. at 433–34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. Id. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Id. at 433–34.
267. Id. at 434–35.
268. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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Court held that the work papers of an independent certified public
accountant were not protected from disclosure in response to an IRS
269
summons. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, relied
primarily on the canon that “restrictions upon the IRS summons
power should be avoided absent unambiguous directions from
270
Congress,”
and he found no unambiguous evidence in this
271
instance.
In each of these decisions, the majority regarded a tax-specific
substantive canon as integral to its reasoning. All three cases featured
unanimous opinions and none involved majority use of legislative
history. Instead, the majority invoked a canon favoring broad tax
coverage or broad IRS authority and relied on that judicial policy
norm to frame the Court’s analysis. The Court borrows from taxbased canons to help justify its results in a number of other cases,
often in majority opinions that command broad support and omit
272
reliance on legislative history. By contrast, the Court virtually never
invokes a workplace-specific substantive canon to help support its
273
holding.
The Court’s substantially greater reliance on subject-specific

269. See id. at 815–21.
270. Id. at 816.
271. See id. at 817–21.
272. See Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 790 (2008) (9–0 decision) (invoking the canon
that “an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace” and the taxpayer bears the
burden of demonstrating eligibility (quoting INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84
(1992))); Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 401 (1984) (8–1 decision) (invoking the canon that
a clear statement from Congress is needed for an exception favoring the taxpayer); United
States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980) (6–3 decision) (invoking the clear statement rule for an
exemption to an IRS summons); see also Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95
(2001) (7–2 decision) (invoking the canon that tax exemptions must be clearly expressed; five
members of Court also rely on legislative history); United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 493 U.S. 132, 145 (1989) (9–0 decision) (invoking the canon that “tax provisions . . .
incorporate domestic tax concepts absent a clear congressional exemption that foreign concepts
control” and relying on legislative history). The large number of tax-specific substantive canons
may be related to the presence of specialized tax courts that are perhaps more inclined to
generate these norms based on their expert understanding of federal tax policies. We hope a tax
law scholar will explore the origins and development of tax canons as a separate project.
273. Of the five instances in which the Court relied on a subject specific canon to help justify
a workplace law result, four instances actually involve subjects other than workplace law. See
Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 (2006) (bankruptcy
law); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991) (antitrust);
Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1988) (commercial law); Windward Shipping (London),
Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass’n, 415 U.S. 104, 109–10, 112–13 (1974) (international maritime trade).
The fifth case invoked the presumption favoring labor arbitration. Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local
358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 254–55 (1977).
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canons in tax cases is consistent with our finding of reliance on
legislative history for expertise borrowing. In a field in which many
Justices lack confidence in their mastery of the technical and
conceptual intricacies, and may also have minimal interest in pursuing
such mastery, relying on particularized policy norms is
understandable. The same concerns that led Justice Douglas to
complain about the Court’s lack of tax expertise will encourage the
Justices—even if subconsciously—to reach for tax-based policy
274
presumptions that constitute a kind of derivative expertise. In this
regard, it is notable that Justice Blackmun—the Justice most
knowledgeable about tax law during this period—almost never
invoked these policy norms. Blackmun’s preference for reliance on
text, history, purpose, and precedent presumably reflects greater selfassurance regarding his own situational judgment in this subject area.
2. Using Structural Language Canons to Construe a SelfContained Tax Code. More than nine times out of ten in which the
Court invokes language canons in its tax decisions, those canons
consist of the whole act rule or similar presumptions implicating the
275
larger cohesion or structural integrity of the text. Sometimes, this
reliance involves applying the whole act rule or the presumption
276
against surplusage to a single section of the Internal Revenue Code
277
or to closely adjacent related sections. Very often however, the
Court invokes what one might refer to as a whole code rule.
The Court in these whole code instances reasons that when
Congress expresses or describes a tax law concept in one part of the
Internal Revenue Code, that expression or description should be
deemed probative regarding Congress’s treatment of the concept in a
274. The most plausible justification for such subject-specific norms is a judicial belief that
Congress intends its tax legislation to be interpreted in this manner. Granting arguendo that
Congress generally wants tax exemptions to be narrowly construed and gains to be assigned to
those who earn them, reliance on these presumptions allows the Justices to minimize in-depth
or de novo inquiry into what Congress meant to accomplish through a particular exemption or
income provision. For this reason, we refer to the Court’s reliance on substantive tax canons as a
subsidiary or derivative form of expertise borrowing.
275. See supra Table 6: Mean Percent Reliance on Language Canon Subsets when Language
Canons Are Present, 1969–2008 (finding that the court involved structural cohesion or integrity
canons in forty-three of forty-seven language canon decisions).
276. See e.g., Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 787–89 (interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 67(e)); Badaracco, 464
U.S. at 395–97 (interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 6501).
277. See, e.g., Baral v. United States, 528 U.S. 431, 437 (2000) (contrasting 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511
and 6513); Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1996) (contrasting 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511(a) and
6512).
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separate part of the code. One code provision may shed light on the
meaning of another either because several sections should be read as
278
embodying a consistent approach or because differences between
two or more sections indicate that Congress intended the sections to
279
have distinct consequences. The Justices also have extended the
code’s self-contained status in order to harmonize provisions and
280
sections enacted years or decades apart.
The Court’s whole code approach rests on an implicit assumption
that Congress is a collection of relatively omniscient drafters who
generate coherent and integrated provisions over many decades of
281
legislating. That assumption has been criticized by legal scholars for
projecting an unrealistic level of congressional foresight and for
ignoring the purposive framework in which Congress drafts each
282
statute. The omniscient drafter assumption does appear suspect
when contemplating the possibility of consistent use or expression
across several separate statutes or even across several distinct
enactments within a single regulatory regime.
One might argue, however, that concerns about disregard for
historical context and intent resonate less when it comes to the largely
unified and self-referential regulatory scheme embodied in the
internal revenue laws. For this discrete portion of the U.S. Code,
which is amended in some fashion almost annually and substantially
updated at regular intervals, perhaps congressional drafters are better
able to anticipate and avoid semantic residues or repetitions. The

278. See, e.g., Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 56–57 (1999) (“The absence of any
recognition of disclaimers in [26 U.S.C.] §§ 6321, 6322, 6331(a) and 6334(a) and (c) . . . contrasts
with § 2518 of the Code . . . .”); United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546, 555–56 & n.7 (1993)
(attributing a consistent meaning to the phrase “improvements and betterments” in 26 U.S.C. §
263 and § 1016 regulations, as distinct from “improvements” in 26 U.S.C. § 611).
279. See, e.g., United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213,
222–23 (1996) (distinguishing 26 U.S.C. §§ 4971, 4401, 7806 and 507); United States v. Dalm, 494
U.S. 596, 601–02 (1990) (using § 7422(a) and § 6511(a) to narrow the breadth of § 1346(a)(1));
United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 695–98 (1983) (comparing § 7403 with § 6331); Laing v.
United States, 423 U.S. 161, 176–77 (1976) (recognizing that, unlike § 6861 et seq., exceptions to
§ 6871(b) are explicit).
280. See, e.g., Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 13–16 (2004) (examining provisions of and
amendments to ERISA as a whole); United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 745–
46 (1977) (harmonizing the Revenue Act of 1921 with § 820, added in 1959).
281. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 150–53; William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of
Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1148 (1992).
282. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 279–82, 280; William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress
Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 176–77, 230–45 (2000); Popkin, supra
note 281, at 1148–52; Ross, supra note 2, at 572.
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Court’s tendency to assume thoroughness and cohesion in tax
statutory language may in turn be less naive or aspirational given the
bipartisan, interbranch, and professionalized drafting process that has
long characterized the tax area. Once again, the Justices—however
subconsciously—seem to be expressing their respect for this
distinctive lawmaking process.
We are not contending that increased reliance on a whole code
approach should be accompanied by diminished attention to
legislative intent or purpose. Numerous tax scholars have counseled
283
against that interpretive strategy. Moreover, for most of our thirtynine year period, the Court’s greater reliance on structural language
canons (relative to workplace law decisions) was accompanied by a
greater reliance on legislative history as well. This raises the
possibility that the Justices may have found the two resources to be
mutually reinforcing given the special features of tax legislation. At
the same time, the precipitous decline in the use of legislative history
in tax cases since 1998 may well be related to the Court’s loss of
expertise and interest in this area, as we discuss.
C. Justice Blackmun
We noted in Part II.D the unusual degree to which Justice
Blackmun anchored the Court’s treatment of tax law during his
284
Although all Justices bring distinctive
twenty-four terms.
professional backgrounds and experiences to the Court, Blackmun’s
role as a tax law expert—one who practiced in the area for over two
285
decades and also wrote articles and taught courses on the subject —
may help account for his exceptional role in this specialized field.
Blackmun’s contributions to the volume of federal tax opinions have
no parallel in the Court’s workplace law docket. He authored twice as
many majorities as any other Justice, he wrote more dissents than his
colleagues (especially remarkable given his high number of majority

283. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 55, at 829–31, 831; Moran & Schneider, supra note 55,
at 892; Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue
Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623, 630 (1986).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 129–34.
285. See supra note 128 (referencing several articles and speeches by Justice Blackmun);
HARRY A. BLACKMUN AS INTERVIEWED BY HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSCRIPT: THE
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT 97 (1997), available at http://lcweb2.
loc.gov/diglib/blackmun-public/series.html?ID=D09 (discussing Blackmun teaching a tax law
course at St. Paul College of Law, which has become William Mitchell College of Law, in 1930s
and 1940s).
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opinions), and, for every tax law per curiam decision during his
286
tenure, he either authored the opinion or wrote a dissent.
Justice Blackmun also anchored the Court’s approach to tax law
from a qualitative standpoint. Assuming that one classifies the
Court’s decisions as either progovernment or protaxpayer,
Blackmun’s majorities are slightly more progovernment than the
Court’s as a whole, both for the Burger period and during the
287
Rehnquist/Roberts years. As Table 10 indicates, Blackmun’s 76
percent progovernment majority opinions place him roughly in the
middle compared to other Justices who authored five or more tax
288
majorities. In this regard, it is notable that Justice Blackmun’s 76
percent progovernment figure makes his Court opinions less
supportive of the government’s legal position than the opinions of
both some Justices who are routinely viewed as liberal (Marshall,
Brennan) and some others who are generally regarded as
conservative (Burger, Rehnquist). At the same time, Blackmun’s
majorities are more progovernment than still other Justices who are
traditionally thought of as liberal (Souter, Ginsburg) and conservative
289
(Powell, Thomas).

286. See supra Table 8: Percentage of Majority Opinions Authored by the Four Most
Prolific Justices in Tax and Workplace Law during Their Tenure on the Court and
accompanying text.
287. The Court’s eighty-six tax decisions in the Burger period favored the government 73.3
percent of the time and the taxpayer 23.3 percent of the time, whereas Blackmun’s twenty-four
majorities were 79.2 percent progovernment and 16.7 percent protaxpayer. During the
Rehnquist/Robert years, the Court’s seventy-two tax decisions were 68.1 percent
progovernment and 29.2 percent protaxpayer, whereas Blackmun’s ten majorities in those years
were 70 percent progovernment and 30 percent protaxpayer. Some of these percentages do not
add up to 100 because five Court decisions (one authored by Blackmun) are coded as a mixed
result.
288. The six Justices with higher progovernment ratios than Blackmun authored a total of
fifty-two majority opinions during our thirty-nine-year period. The eight Justices with lower
progovernment ratios authored fifty-seven majority opinions in this period.
289. We find the distinction between progovernment and protaxpayer outcomes easier to
rely on than the liberal-conservative distinction we used in our prior research involving
workplace law. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 27 & n.105 (explaining why Congress’s
essentially unidirectional legislative goals in the workplace law area—augmenting employee
protections to improve the conditions of employment—make it relatively easy to code outcomes
on a liberal (proemployee) versus conservative (proemployer) scale). Justice Blackmun’s cohort
of tax majorities exemplifies that progovernment decisions may plausibly be deemed liberal if
corporations or wealthy individuals are forced to pay taxes, see, e.g., INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 90 (1992); Portland Golf Club v. Comm’r, 497 U.S. 154, 171 (1990); Nat’l
Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488–89 (1979); United States v. Chi.,
Burlington & Quincy R.R., 412 U.S. 401, 415–16 (1973), yet conservative if law-enforcement
powers are applied to limit procedural or due process–type protections, see, e.g., United States
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Table 10: Percent of Progovernment and Protaxpayer Majorities By
Justices Authoring at Least Five Tax Majorities*
Justice
Progovernment
Protaxpayer
Burger (8)
100
0
Rehnquist (5)
100
0
Marshall (18)
83
11
Brennan (11)
82
18
Breyer (5)
80
20
Kennedy (5)
80
20
Blackmun (34)
76
21
Powell (10)
70
30
O’Connor (6)
67
17
Souter (9)
56
44
Thomas (6)
50
50
Stevens (7)
43
57
White (8)
38
50
Ginsburg (6)
33
67
Douglas (5)
20
80
*Number of majorities for each Justice in parentheses. Percentages do not
add up to 100 in all instances due to mixed-result majorities.

Blackmun’s location at the center of this continuum comports
with the view that his practical reasoning approach to tax law
commanded respect for being neither ideological nor result oriented.
Tax professors have observed that law school casebooks typically
focus on Blackmun opinions far more than decisions authored by his
290
contemporaries. During his time on the Court, Blackmun received
correspondence from prominent tax scholars regarding his majority
opinions that suggest an underlying esteem for the way he addressed

v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35 (1994); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556–57 (1989); Sorenson
v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 865 (1986); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536
(1971). Likewise, protaxpayer results may sensibly be labeled liberal if they vindicate the rights
of individual or small business taxpayers against an encroaching IRS, see, e.g., Comm’r v.
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35–36 (1987); Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 33
(1978), but conservative if they allow wealthy individuals or “special interest” corporations to
prevail on a claimed deduction or exemption, see, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United
States, 507 U.S. 546, 570 (1993); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978).
290. Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 109, 110 (1998); Stephen B. Cohen, Thurgood Marshall: Tax Lawyer, 80 GEO. L.J. 2011,
2011 (1992). One leading tax law casebook reproduces eleven principal Supreme Court cases
from 1970–94, six authored by Blackmun and no more than two by any other Justice. See ALAN
GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION xv–xxv (6th ed. 2006); see also
RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION xiii–xxvi (2d
ed. 2007) (reproducing nine principal Supreme Court cases from 1970–94, five of which were
authored by Blackmun).
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Since Blackmun retired, scholars have noted his
the issues.
insistence on approaching the interpretation of tax statutes the same
way he approached other laws—by relying on legislative history and
the underlying purposes or equities of the Internal Revenue Code
rather than simply invoking the plain meaning of text so as to
minimize doing harm or committing error in a complex and technical
292
field.
We wondered whether correspondence among the Justices on
individual tax decisions might reflect Justice Blackmun’s role as the
dominant figure in construing federal tax statutes. In an effort to
explore that question, one of us reviewed this correspondence for the
117 federal tax law cases decided by the Court during Justice
293
Blackmun’s tenure. In about one-fourth of the cases, there are
exchanges between Blackmun and other Justices that in the aggregate
294
support the distinctive role he played in tax cases. A record of
correspondence alone is hardly conclusive, but it does tend to confirm
different aspects of Blackmun’s impact.

291. See, e.g., Letter from Bernard Wolfman to Harry Blackmun (June 14, 1994) (on file
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 640) (praising Blackmun’s opinion in United
States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994), as “particularly cogent”); Letter from Erwin Griswold to
Harry Blackmun (Dec. 20, 1991) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 95)
(discussing Freytag v. United States, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)); Letter from Bernard Wolfman to
Harry Blackmun (May 9, 1983) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 376)
(discussing Commissioner v. Tufts, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983)); Letter from Erwin Griswold to Harry
Blackmun (Mar. 15, 1977) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 245)
(discussing Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977)). This is not to suggest
that Blackmun’s tax law jurisprudence was immune to criticism by those same scholars. See, e.g.,
Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon’s Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1075 passim (1981) (critical of Blackmun’s holding and reasoning in Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978)); Letter from Erwin Griswold to Harry Blackmun
(May 22, 1974) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 180) (criticizing
Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974)).
292. See Green, supra note 290, at 130, 136–38 (discussing Blackmun’s “practical reasoning
approach to statutory interpretation”); see also Karen Nelson Moore, Justice Blackmun’s
Contributions on the Court: The Commercial Speech and State Taxation Examples, 8 HAMLINE
L. REV. 29, 43–49 (1985) (discussing Blackmun’s leadership role in shaping the Court’s approach
to state tax cases involving interstate or foreign commerce concerns).
293. Professor Brudney visited the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress on
August 19–20 and September 11–12, 2008; he examined memos to Justice Blackmun from his
law clerks and conference notes in the Justice’s handwriting as well as correspondence between
the Justices during the opinion-writing process. Copies of all documents cited to the Blackmun
Papers are on file with the Duke Law Journal.
294. For twenty-eight of the cases, we found exchanges of some substance involving
Blackmun.
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In Blackmun’s initial years on the Court, notes from other
Justices praising the quality of a draft tax opinion or stating that his
opinion led them to change their votes may reflect collegial courtesy
295
or flattery directed at a newcomer. Moreover, one Justice often
appeared relieved to have a colleague so willing to wield a laboring
296
oar, confiding with some humor his own minimal interest in tax law.
But there also are a large number of decisions in which Blackmun’s
genuine influence is on display.
In one early case, Blackmun’s draft dissent from a denial of the
297
writ of certiorari was quickly joined by three colleagues. The Court
agreed to grant cert, and Blackmun ultimately wrote the majority
298
opinion, converting an additional dissenting vote from conference.
In a number of other instances, Blackmun’s majority opinion led
299
dissenting colleagues to switch their votes and join him. There also
295. See, e.g., Letters from Potter Stewart to William Douglas and Harry Blackmun (Mar.
17, 1971) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 125) (joining Blackmun’s
dissent in United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971)); Letter from Hugo Black to Harry
Blackmun (Mar. 18, 1971) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 125) (same);
Memorandum from Warren Burger to the Conference (Mar. 22, 1971) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 125) (same); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry
Blackmun (Jan. 15, 1973) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 167) (joining
Blackmun’s per curiam opinion in United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973)).
296. See, e.g., Note from William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (Feb. 23, 1981) (on file with
the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 329) (conceding that he “simply cannot get a handle
on a useful dissent” in Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981)); Letter from
William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (Dec. 15, 1981) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra
note 128, Box 350) (expressing relief that Blackmun would write a dissent in Jewett v.
Commissioner, 452 U.S. 305 (1981)); Letter from William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (Nov.
11, 1974) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 195) (joining Blackmun’s
opinion rather than “pursuing . . . a dissent” in Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974)).
297. See First Draft Dissent of Justice Blackmun in United States v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R.J. (Oct. 17, 1972) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166)
(dissenting from a denial of certiorari); Letter from William Douglas to Harry Blackmun (Oct.
17, 1972) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166) (joining Blackmun’s
dissent in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.J.); Letter from Byron White to Harry Blackmun
(Oct. 18, 1972) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166) (same); Letter from
Warren Burger to Harry Blackmun (Oct. 20, 1972) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra
note 128, Box 166) (same).
298. See Memorandum from Randy [Bezanson, law clerk] to Justice Blackmun (Apr. 30,
1973) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166) (discussing Justice Stewart’s
stated intention to dissent in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. for Justice Rehnquist as well as
himself, and adding “I did not mention anything about Justice Rehnquist’s statement to you this
morning.”); Letter from William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (May 4, 1973) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 166) (joining Blackmun’s majority opinion in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R.).
299. See, e.g., Letters from William Brennan to Harry Blackmun (May 26 and May 31, 1978)
(on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 273) (stating he is switching his vote
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is ample evidence of fellow Justices expressing admiration for the
clarity and persuasiveness of Blackmun’s opinion writing in the tax
300
law area. And on one occasion, a colleague writing separately from
Blackmun evidently asked privately for technical feedback on his own
301
draft opinion.
This level of respect did not prevent other Justices from offering
substantive critiques of or suggesting modifications to Blackmun
opinions. On a number of occasions, Justice Blackmun’s colleagues
302
proposed revisions to his draft majority. Blackmun made the

from conference and joining Blackmun’s opinion in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437
U.S. 298 (1978)); Letters from Thurgood Marshall to Harry Blackmun (May 26 and May 31,
1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 273) (same); Letter from Potter
Stewart to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 8, 1979) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128,
Box 282) (joining Blackmun’s opinion in Thor Power Tool v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522
(1979)); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 10, 1979) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 282) (same); Letter from Clarence Thomas to Harry
Blackmun (May 12, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617) (joining
Blackmun’s opinion in Commissioner v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152
(1993)); Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Harry Blackmun (May 7, 1986) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 455) (indicating a plan, later abandoned, to prepare a
dissent in United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U.S. 593 (1986)); cf. Letter from John
Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun (May 21, 1986) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note
128, Box 455) (“Unlike Thurgood I remain unpersuaded and therefore will prepare a dissenting
opinion [in Hughes Properties] . . . .”).
300. See, e.g., Letters from John Paul Stevens and William Brennan to Harry Blackmun
(Jan. 8, 1979) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 282) (complimenting and
joining Blackmun’s opinion in Thor Power Tool); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun
(Jan. 10, 1979) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 282) (“In view of the
universal acclaim of your fine opinion . . . I cheerfully join you, despite continuing reservations
as to the inventory issue.”); Letter from John Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun (May 16, 1983)
(on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 376) (“I wonder if the case would have
been decided the same way if the taxpayers’ brief [in United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677
(1983)] had been even half as persuasive as your opinion.”); Letter from John Paul Stevens to
Harry Blackmun (Jan. 9, 1987) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 470)
(complimenting Blackmun’s knowledge and humor in his opinion in Commissioner v.
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987)); Letter from Anthony Kennedy to Harry Blackmun (Feb. 24,
1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 613) (“Your opinion [in Newark
Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993)] is very fine in all respects.”).
301. See Letter from Harry Blackmun to John Paul Stevens (Feb. 21, 1983) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 368) (discussing Stevens’s concurrence in Hillsboro
National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983)).
302. See, e.g., Letters from William Brennan to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 13, 19, and 23, 1978)
(on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264) (discussing Blackmun’s draft
opinion in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978)); Letter from
John Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun (Feb. 10, 1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra
note 128, Box 264) (same); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (Feb. 14, 1978) (on file
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264) (same); Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry
Blackmun (Mar. 20, 1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 259)
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requested adjustments or negotiated a compromise in some
303
304
instances whereas in other cases he refused to make a change.
Still, the overall impression that emerges from correspondence
among the Justices is one of fairly regular substantive exchanges on
the merits of tax draft opinions with Blackmun playing a central role
305
in many if not most of the exchanges.

(suggesting edits to Blackmun’s draft opinion in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561
(1978)); Letter from Sandra Day O’Connor to Harry Blackmun (April, 25, 1983) (on file with
the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 470) (suggesting changes to Blackmun’s opinion in
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983)); Letter from John Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun
(Apr. 14, 1983) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 470) (same); Letter from
Sandra Day O’Connor to Harry Blackmun (May 10, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers,
supra note 128, Box 617) (suggesting edits to Blackmun’s draft opinion in Commissioner v.
Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152 (1993)); Letter from Anthony Kennedy to
Harry Blackmun (May 11, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617)
(same), Letter from Clarence Thomas to Harry Blackmun (May 13, 1993) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617) (same).
303. See, e.g., Letter from Harry Blackmun to John Paul Stevens (Feb. 10, 1978) (on file
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264) (accepting Stevens’s suggestion in Central
Illinois); Letter from Harry Blackmun to Lewis Powell (Mar. 21, 1978) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 259) (accepting Powell’s suggestions in Frank Lyon Co.);
Letter from Harry Blackmun to Sandra Day O’Connor (May 17, 1993) (on file with the
Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617) (omitting a section of his draft opinion in Keystone
Consolidated Industries per O’Connor’s request).
304. See, e.g., Letters from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan (Jan. 16 and 20, 1978) (on
file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264) (declining Brennan’s suggested
statement in Central Illinois); Letters from Harry Blackmun to Anthony Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas (May 17, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 617) (refusing
to accommodate Kennedy’s and Thomas’s suggested changes in Keystone Consolidated
Industries); see also Letter from Harry Blackmun to Sandra Day O’Connor (Jan. 12, 1987) (on
file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 470) (making some but not all of the
changes requested in Groetzinger); Letter from Harry Blackmun to Lewis Powell (Oct. 27,
1976) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 238) (making some but not all of
the changes requested in a dissent to United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976)).
305. There are an ample number of exchanges between Justices other than Blackmun on
draft opinions not authored by Blackmun. See, e.g., Letters Between Justices Stevens and
Brennan (January 24, 1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 264)
(discussing Brennan’s draft opinion in Fulman v. United States, 431 U.S. 928 (1977)); Letters
Between Justices Kennedy and Souter (Jan. 7 and 11, 1993) (on file with the Blackmun Papers,
supra note 128, Box 615) (negotiating edits in Souter’s draft opinion in United States v. Hill, 506
U.S. 546 (1993)); Letters Between Justices O’Connor and Souter (Apr. 5 and 12, 1994) (on file
with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 638) (suggesting edits to Souter’s draft opinion
in United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994)). At the same time, there are exchanges in which
the majority author negotiates to secure Blackmun’s support even as Blackmun also drafts a
concurring opinion. See, e.g., Letters Between William Rehnquist and Harry Blackmun (Apr. 28
and May 11, 1983) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 381) (discussing
O’Connor’s draft opinion and Blackmun’s draft concurrence in Regan v. Taxation With
Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)); Letters Between Byron White and Harry Blackmun (Nov.
10, Dec. 1, 4, and 6, 1978) (on file with the Blackmun Papers, supra note 128, Box 283)
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Assuming arguendo that Blackmun was in fact and to an unusual
degree a pivotal influence on tax law jurisprudence during his twentyfour terms, what impact if any might this have had on the Court’s
reasoning approach? There have been only thirty-two federal tax
decisions in the fourteen terms since Blackmun’s departure. In these
decisions, the post-Blackmun Court has relied somewhat more on
306
text and language canons in these decisions, and the Court has
307
relied significantly less on legislative history.
During Blackmun’s tenure, he invoked legislative history
regularly in his majorities, and so did the Court as a whole. It seems at
least plausible that Blackmun’s understanding of tax law and his
attentiveness to the intricacies of legislative history often
accompanying tax law disputes may have served as a cue, helping to
stimulate a similar willingness by his colleagues to engage this
308
resource. In that regard, four of the Justices who most frequently
interacted with Blackmun on the merits of his draft opinions were
309
Justices Stevens, Powell, O’Connor, and Brennan. These four
Justices relied on legislative history in 77 percent of the thirty tax
310
majorities they authored while serving with Blackmun. Encouraged
by Blackmun’s example and leadership, they and other Justices may

(withdrawing a proposed concurrence after White circulated a second draft in United California
Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978)).
306. Reliance on text since 1994 has been 71.9 percent (23 of 32 cases) versus 65.5 percent of
cases during Blackmun’s tenure (76 of 116 cases from the 1970–94 terms). Reliance on language
canons since 1994 has been 40.6 percent (13 of 32 cases) versus 27.6 percent of cases in the
Blackmun years (32 of 116 cases from the 1970–94 terms).
307. Reliance on legislative history since 1994 has been 34.4 percent of cases (11 of 32 of
cases), which contrasts with 62.9 percent during the Blackmun period (73 of 116 of cases for the
1970–94 terms). This difference is highly significant (t = .001).
308. Our suggestion that Blackmun’s use of tax legislative history functioned as a cue for
many of his colleagues may help account for why, collectively, they relied on this resource
slightly more often even than he did, see supra Table 9: Comparing Justice Blackmun’s Reliance
on Legislative History in Tax Cases with the Reliance of Other Justices, and then continued to
rely on it at a high level for the first several years after he retired, see supra note 143. Once the
reinforcing “lesson” of Blackmun’s approach wore off, however, it was replaced by the more
generic reinforcement of Justice Scalia’s hostility to legislative history.
309. See sources cited supra notes 300–04.
310. For O’Connor the figure is 100 percent (four of four cases); for Stevens the figure is 80
percent (four of five cases); for Brennan 91 percent (ten of eleven cases); and for Powell 50
percent (five of ten cases). O’Connor and Stevens invoked legislative history in one of the four
majorities they authored after Blackmun’s departure.
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have been more willing to treat tax law seriously—even if they also
311
expressed on occasion some distaste for the subject.
The readiness of Justice Blackmun’s colleagues to rely on
legislative history does not mean they were always as comfortable
with this expertise-laden resource as was Blackmun himself. Some
indication of the other Justices’ differing level of confidence may be
seen when examining their respective approaches to invoking
legislative history in dissents if the majority had relied on that history.
Justice Blackmun was much more likely than his colleagues to use
legislative history in dissent to counter legislative history reliance in a
312
majority opinion. And his colleagues were especially reluctant to
313
rely on this history when Blackmun authored the majority.
Nonetheless, it remains true that other Justices used legislative
history more often than not in their majority opinions until Blackmun
departed from the Court.
Further, since Blackmun’s retirement, tax cases have comprised a
smaller share of the Court’s decisions. During Blackmun’s twentyfour years of service, federal income tax cases comprised 3.53 percent
of the Court’s docket—including 4.04 percent in the first eight terms
314
of the Rehnquist Court. Since 1994, that proportion has fallen to

311. For instances of the occasional expression of distaste for tax law, see, for example,
Letter from John Paul Stevens to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 8, 1979) (on file with the Blackmun
Papers, supra note 128, Box 282) (“Dear Harry, As you know, I am no fan of tax cases. But I
must confess that if I had known that this case [Thor Power Tool v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522
(1979)] was going to result in such a fine opinion, I would have voted to grant cert.”); Letter
from William Rehnquist to Harry Blackmun (Dec. 15, 1981) (on file with the Blackmun Papers,
supra note 128, Box 350) (“Dear Harry: As you might have guessed, I am delighted that you are
willing to take on the dissent in this case [Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982)].”).
312. In fifty nonunanimous tax law cases in which the majority relied on legislative history,
the dissent relied on legislative history sixteen times, or 32 percent of the time. When Justice
Blackmun wrote the dissent he used legislative history to counter majority reliance on
legislative history 50 percent of the time (five of ten cases); when other Justices authored the
dissent they invoked legislative history 28 percent of the time (eleven of forty cases).
313. Of the forty dissents authored by other Justices, thirty-one occurred during Justice
Blackmun’s tenure and nine of them invoked legislative history. When Blackmun authored the
majority, dissent reliance was only 17 percent (two of twelve cases). When others authored the
majority, dissent reliance rose to 37 percent (seven of nineteen cases).
314. From the 1970 Term through the 1993 Term, the Court decided 116 federal tax cases
out of 3,287 total merits decisions. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 87–92 tbl.2-11 (4th ed. 2007); Brudney
& Distlear, supra note 63. During the first eight years of the Rehnquist Court, the Justices
decided 40 tax cases out of 990 merits decisions. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra at 87–92 tbl.2-11;
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 63.
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315

2.95 percent, a one-sixth decline from the overall Blackmun era
average. Other factors may be contributing to this decline apart from
the diminished interest and confidence of the Justices. Congress has
enacted fewer comprehensive or conceptually innovative federal tax
laws in recent decades; one result may be a gradual decline in
316
appellate litigation about new interpretive matters. In addition, a
growing IRS interest in settling disputes at a pre-judicial stage may
317
lead to fewer cert-worthy cases.
But whatever the weight
attributable to each factor, it seems that the Court is less interested
in—and perhaps less invested in grappling with—expertise-related
issues of federal tax law since Blackmun’s departure. At a minimum,
this development suggests that the judicial asset of diverse
professional experience deserves further scholarly attention.
CONCLUSION
At the outset, we described how statutory interpretation debates
have generally assumed that the virtues or vices of key interpretive
resources are systemic in nature. Against this backdrop, our review of
the Court’s interpretive approach in tax law reveals some intriguing
differences from the Justices’ reasoning in the workplace law area.
Because normative discussion and empirical research (including our
own) have focused primarily on ideologically charged areas such as
labor and civil rights, the reasoning patterns we have observed for tax
315. From the 1994 Term through the 2007 Term, the Court decided 32 federal tax cases out
of 1,084 merits decisions. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, Table
2–11, 1946–2006 Terms (4th ed. revised 2007), available at CQ Press Electronic Library, The
Supreme Court Compendium Online Edition, http://library.cqpress.com/sccm/scc4thR_tab2-11
(last visited Feb. 5, 2009) (subscription required) (reporting 1015 total decisions from the 1994
term through the 2006 term); Statistics for the Supreme Court’s October Term 2007, 77 U.S.L.W.
3063, 3072 (Aug. 5, 2008) (reporting 69 total merits opinions from argued and non-argued
cases).
316. See Staudt et al., supra note 71, at 1818 n.68 (observing that Congress revised the tax
code twenty-three times between 1913 and 1954, but that the code’s basic structure has been
unchanged since 1954).
317. See, e.g., IRS Launches New Settlement Initiative for Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Aug. 7, 2008, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 153-1; IRS Announces Settlement Initiative for
Wide Array of Transactions, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 28, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 208-13; IRS
Announces Employer-Provided Meals Settlement Initiative, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 5, 1998,
LEXIS, 98 TNT 150-8. See generally Gregory P. Mathews, Using Negotiation, Mediation, and
Arbitration to Resolve IRS-Taxpayer Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 709 (2004)
(examining the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques by the IRS); David
Parsly, The Internal Revenue Service and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Moving from Infancy
to Legitimacy, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 677 (2007) (detailing types of ADR programs
implemented by the IRS).
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law reveal an underappreciated judicial angle of vision on the
legislative process.
The Court in its tax law decisions relies significantly more often
on both language canons and legislative history, for seemingly related
reasons. The Justices’ extraordinary focus on language canons
promoting structural integrity suggests a belief, even if implicit, that
the federal tax code is best viewed as a single integrated whole
notwithstanding its size and its construction over many decades. That
belief presumably derives in part from an appreciation for the legacy
of professional and nonpartisan legislative drafting on tax matters.
These same qualities of objectivity, nonpartisanship, and crossbranch cooperation also apply to the drafting of tax legislative
history. The Court’s record of crediting standing committee reports
reflects an understanding that these committee narratives—prepared
by experts—assume special value in an area where the textual
language and policy concepts are technically complex and less readily
decipherable. The majority opinions we reviewed illustrate how the
Court uses tax legislative history to borrow expertise, in contrast to
the more familiar reliance on this history to help discern the existence
or details of a congressional compromise. The Court’s interest in
expertise borrowing is also manifested in a more derivative way with
respect to the substantive canons. Although the Justices’ overall use
of substantive canons is no heavier in tax law than workplace law,
their disproportionate reliance on tax-based canons reflects a
willingness to invoke tax policy presumptions as a way of shaping and
simplifying their analyses.
In our prior empirical research addressing the Court’s statutory
workplace decisions, we demonstrated that the Justices’ use of
legislative history to identify and describe legislative bargains was
more principled than some critics have suggested, whereas the
Rehnquist Court’s reliance on the canons was more instrumental and
318
politicized than had previously been recognized. For the Court’s
statutory tax decisions, different functional priorities seem to apply—
specifically, expertise borrowing is a central value for the Justices.
The fact that familiar interpretive resources play distinctive roles in
the area of tax law contributes to a subtler and richer texture for
statutory interpretation than is often captured in scholarly debates. In
318. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 137–60 (reporting and discussing the
legislative history results); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 18, at 53–69, 77–97 (reporting and
discussing the canons results).

BRUDNEY IN FINAL2.DOC

2009]

5/5/2009 4:02:09 PM

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1311

addition, the Blackmun effect suggests that at least for a field
perceived as tepid in terms of ideology and also judicial interest, the
Justices may be willing to follow the interpretive example of a
knowledgeable colleague when grappling with statutory challenges.
Most Justices who served during the Burger or
Rehnquist/Roberts periods seem to have participated in this relatively
nuanced approach to statutory construction. That is not necessarily
true, however, for Justices with a more inflexible vision of the
interpretive enterprise. Moreover, our results also suggest that the
Court has recently exhibited greater uniformity in its patterns of
319
reasoning in tax law and workplace law cases.
Perhaps the
philosophical arguments favoring one-size-fits-all statutory
interpretation are beginning to trump a pragmatic orientation that is
more sensitive to differences among particular subject matter areas of
federal law. We hope other scholars will pursue this question by
examining the Court’s reasoning in potentially distinctive fields such
as criminal or environmental law.
Insofar as we are witnessing the advent of a more monolithic
Court position toward interpreting statutes, this trend is likely to
320
influence the behavior of other judges and practicing attorneys. A
clear signal from the Justices that canons and legislative history
should be valued or discounted with little attention to the law’s
varying substantive contexts would effectively encourage lawyers and
lower courts to modify their own reasoning methods and techniques.
Before such a trend accelerates, we hope that Justices and judges with
a more pragmatic orientation will consider whether a standardized
approach to interpretation adequately respects the diverse and
intricate features of the American statutory fabric.

319. See supra text accompanying Table 2: Reliance on Selected Interpretive Resources—
Burger Court Decisions and Rehnquist/Roberts Court Decisions; supra text accompanying note
93.
320. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 52, at 170–71 (discussing the normative
implications of Justice Scalia’s impact on colleagues with respect to legislative history use).

